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ABSTRACT The increasingly active role of international organisations in conflict 
prevention, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction in recent years has 
been complemented by a continuous shift from humanitarian assistance and relief 
towards a more holistic and sustainable response to complex emergencies. 
Concentrating on a sub-national level, this paper analyses the potential and 
practical results of the area-based development approach (ABD) in contributing to 
conflict prevention and in linking reconstruction and development. Firstly, it 
analyses its theoretical and methodological underpinnings in light of current 
academic discourse on conflict and reconstruction. Secondly, it assesses the 
practical contribution of two ABD programmes in the South and Southwest Serbia 
to conflict prevention and development. Based on the results of the theoretical and 
empirical part, the paper sets out to summarize and discuss the key strengths and 
limitations of the approach. It argues that although ABD is often very effective in 
responding to complex conflict characteristics on sub-national levels, under its 
current conceptualization and implementation practices, it suffers from a limited 
ability to respond to a full complexity of issues related to conflict and development 
on multiple levels. In other words, the contradiction in the terms ‘integrated’ and 
‘area-based’ needs to be addressed both conceptually and in practical applications. 
In the final part, the paper formulates recommendations for the improvement of 
the approach in this respect.  
KEY WORDS: area-based development, conflict prevention, reconstruction.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The end of the cold war led to an increasingly active role of the United Nations and other international 
organisations in conflict prevention, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.1 At the same 
time, there has been a continuous shift from humanitarian assistance and relief towards a more 
holistic and sustainable response to complex emergencies, including further emphasis on 
reconstruction and development. This shift is simultaneously reflected in corresponding academic 
discourse. Already in the Nineties, an increasing number of scholars recognised that conflict is a 
complex phenomenon and proposed to design the post-conflict reconstruction in a multifaceted way 
addressing the root causes and characteristics of conflict. Both scholars and practitioners also 
recognized the importance of simultaneously reconstructing political authority and economic 
arrangements through a series of long-term interventions. Reconstruction should therefore 
increasingly lead to political, economic, and security issues being integrated into a new type of 
                                               
Acknowledgement: The case studies in this study have been prepared based on the mission reports of conflict mitigation 
missions to South Serbia and Southwest Serbia (Sandzak) commissioned by UNDP Serbia. These missions, which took place in 
September and December 2007, were undertaken and reports prepared together with Mr. David Nyheim, International Conflict 
and Security Consulting Ltd., London, UK. The author would like to acknowledge Mr. Nyheim’s crucial contribution to the 
preparation of this paper, especially chapter 4. The paper also benefited from the comments provided by Mary Kaldor, Vesna 
Bojicic-Dzelilovic and Iavor Rangelov from LSE and Andrey Ivanov, Tom Thorogood and Ben Slay from UNDP on earlier drafts, 
the author would like to thank them for their support.       
 
1 For terminology on conflict prevention, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction see, for example, Miall, H. and O. 
Ramsbotham, T. Woodhouse (1999) Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Polity Press, Cambridge&Oxford, chapter 3, Kaldor, M. 
and M. Martin, S. Selchow (2007) ‘Human Security: A New Strategic Narrative for Europe’, International Affairs, 83:2 (2007), 
273-288, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, p. 274-278, and Keen D. (2007) Complex Emergencies, Cambridge: Polity 
Press, p. 102.  
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approach seeking to enhance the legitimacy of international or local institutions and to mobilise 
popular support.2 
 
Due to the complexity and political sensitivity of the implementation of an integrated approach to 
complex emergencies, there are only a limited number of successful applications of such an approach 
on the supra-national and national levels.3 Simultaneously, there has been a significant effort to 
implement holistic and integrated approaches to conflict situations on the sub-national, regional or 
local levels. These approaches, with the ambitious goal of linking post-conflict reconstruction and 
long-term development, have become over time rather popular and marked by considerable 
experimentation and innovation. Among these approaches, the integrated area-based development 
approach (ABD), developed by UNDP and UNOPS, has been broadly considered as appropriate for 
addressing complex conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction in conflict regions. Empirical 
evidence from numerous evaluations of such programmes implemented by international 
organizations across the world suggests that they perform well in such a context.4 
 
Despite successful results in many parts of the world, given the multi-dimensionality of conflict and 
development,5 one should question the ability of localized approaches to address these systemically 
resulting in sustainable peace and development. This study will therefore analyze the theoretical and 
methodological underpinnings of the area-based development approach as well as its practical 
applications firstly to identify strengths, weaknesses and limitations of this approach and secondly to 
formulate prescriptive recommendations for its potential improvement. It will argue that although 
ABD is often very effective in responding to complex conflict characteristics on the sub-national levels, 
under its current conceptualization and implementation practices, it suffers from a limited ability to 
respond to a full complexity of issues related to conflict and development. This is partly due to its 
inability to incorporate crucial characteristics and conditions originating beyond the targeted area. In 
other words, the contradiction in the terms ‘integrated’ and ‘area-based’ needs to be addressed both 
conceptually and in practical application. The study will therefore set out to formulate 
recommendations in this respect attempting to make the approach more effective, leading to systemic 
change and sustainable solutions.   
 
In order to better understand this contradiction and substantiate the above-mentioned argument, in 
the first – theoretical – part, the study will describe the area-based development approach, its genesis, 
definition and main principles. Further, it will examine current academic discourse on conflict and 
reconstruction. Against this theoretical framework, as the approach should be capable of addressing 
the key conflict characteristics and dynamics, the study will critically assess the ability of ABD to 
respond to conflict situations as well as its relation to other potential responses to conflict and 
principles of reconstruction recommended by the scholars. 
 
In the second – empirical – part, the study will analyze the practical results and conflict mitigation 
contribution of the area-based development programmes implemented in conflict settings in two 
regions in the Republic of Serbia. For both case studies in South Serbia and Southwest Serbia 
(Sandzak), the methodological approach will include context analysis, a systematic and critical 
assessment of the conflict mitigation contribution of the programme components and a summary of 
identified strengths and limitations. The peace and conflict assessment in the context analyses will be 
based on the findings of the theoretical part of the study. The case studies have been selected as 
                                               
2 See, for example,  Kaldor, M. (2007) New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Polity 
Press), pp. 145-147; Brown, E. M. (Ed.) (1996) The International Dimension of Internal Conflict, CSIA Studies in International 
Security, Cambridge: MIT Press; Kaldor, M. at al (2006) UNDP Support to Conflict-Affected Countries, Evaluation Office, 
United Nations Development Programme, p. 21.    
3 See, for example, Keen (2007), pp. 188-193 and 213-214 and Rondinelli, D. and J. Montgomery (2005) ‘Regime Change and 
Nation Building: Can Donors Restore Governance in Post-conflict States?, Public Administration and Development, 25, 15-23, 
p. 18.  
4 UNDP (2007) Supporting Capacities for Integrated Local Development. Practice Note, BCPR, New York, p. 13, UNDP (2003) 
UNDP and Area-Based Development Programmes: An Overview, Bureau for Crises Prevention and Recovery, New York.  
5 See, for example, on development Ranis G. and F. Stewart, E. Samman (2006) ‘Human Development: Beyond the Human 
Development Index’, Journal of Human Development, 7:3, 323-358 and any of Global Human Development Reports published 
by UNDP, and on conflict chapter 3 of this study.    
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representative of ABD applications in conflict settings. As the conflicts in the two regions differ, this 
will allow for illustrating potential differences in the application of the approach in different types and 
phases of conflict.  
 
Based on the findings of both the theoretical and empirical parts, complemented by broader 
consultation with other practitioners involved in the implementation of similar approaches, the final 
part of the paper will set out to summarize and discuss a number of strengths, weaknesses as well as 
limitations of the area-based development approach in addressing conflict and to formulate 
prescriptive recommendations for further improvement of this approach as a conflict prevention tool.  
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2. AREA-BASED DEVELOPMENT APPROACH – GENESIS, DEFINITION AND MAIN PRINCIPLES   
 
The following chapter will describe the genesis of the area-based development approach, its initial 
applications, its evolution as well as its current definition and conceptualisation. 
              
Genesis. The recognition that traditional and often fragmented approaches and programmes were 
unable to adequately respond to complex conflict and development situations led to an increasing 
shift from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to a more holistic and sustainable response to 
complex emergencies. Targeting the sub-national level, in 1989 the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) launched, almost simultaneously, three major post-conflict programmes in 
Afghanistan, Central America and Sudan.6 Through these, UNDP started to establish a track record in 
managing complex operations including rehabilitation, reconciliation and social stability in countries 
affected by complex emergencies. It also began to develop a distinct integrated area-based 
development approach. The programmes responded to diverse needs. In Afghanistan, despite 
continuing military conflict, it supported the local population in taking responsibility for 
infrastructure and the rehabilitation of agricultural activities and in Sudan it facilitated the 
stabilization of the population suffering from drought and displacement outside the conflict area. In 
Central America, where the programmes covered six countries and operated in 11 war-affected areas, 
they facilitated transition from conflict to development through local initiatives and reconciliation 
consistent with a regional peace plan. The programmes focused on human rights, reintegration of 
returnees, participatory development planning, restoration of basic services and rebuilding of the local 
economy, always using a decentralised, integrated and bottom-up approach.7  
 
Building on the positive results of early interventions and largely based on the principles used in 
Central America, between 1991 and 1993 UNDP started three new major programmes in Cambodia, 
Somalia and Myanmar and a number of similar initiatives in conflict countries afterwards.8 Since 
then, ABD has often been at the core of UNDP’s strategy for conflict prevention and post-conflict 
reconstruction as an instrument of fostering stability, strengthening communities and building local 
and national capacity.9 Simultaneously, it has also been used in the areas affected by natural disasters 
or experiencing poverty and exclusion. Focusing specifically on Europe and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), which is relevant for this study, the ABD approach has been mostly applied 
in conflict and post-conflict settings. In these settings, the complexity of challenges have required a 
comprehensive and integrated, multi-sector, multi-level and multi-agency response coupled with the 
flexibility to adequately respond to sometimes rapidly changing conditions. For example, out of 27 
ABD programmes implemented by UNDP in this region by 2007 almost half of the interventions were 
related to conflict (48%), less than one third primarily to poverty (30%), with disaster or exclusion 
related programmes being less frequent. As far as specific components of the programmes are 
concerned, all programmes included support to basic infrastructure and services, 74% local economic 
development, 67% community empowerment, 63% support to public administration reform and 
governance, 44% social development and assistance, 41% conflict prevention and tolerance 
promotion, and finally 33% policy and institutional reform. At the same time, more that 70% of 
programmes have had four or more components indicating the genuinely integrated, multi-
dimensional and multi-sector character of these interventions.10 
 
Definition, objectives and main principles. Drawing on the experience and lessons learned from 
programmes implemented in a post-conflict context, UNDP defines area-based development as: “An 
                                               
6 UNDP (2003) UNDP and Area-Based Development Programmes: An Overview, Bureau for Crises Prevention and Recovery, 
New York.  
7 Harfst, J. (2006) A Practitioner’s Guide to Area-Based Development Programming, United Nations Development 
Programme, Bratislava, p. 10.  
8 For example in Africa in the Horn of Africa, the African Great Lakes, and Sierra Leone, in Asia (Tajikistan, Ferghana Valley, 
Papua New Guinea), Europe (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Albania, Ukraine), and the Caribbean (Haiti). Many of the 
programmes, especially those in the 90’s, were implemented by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).  
9 UNDP (2003), p. 3. 
10 Harfst (2006), p. 63.  
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approach designed to help countries address the needs of populations affected by the crisis, primarily 
returning refugees, displaced people and demobilized combatants, by enabling or reinforcing 
communities’ capacities. The approach reconciles long and short-term objectives: responding to 
immediate needs, alleviating crisis-induced economic devastation and promoting social reconciliation 
at the local level in a context of respect of human rights. The territorial focus of ABD approach was 
derived from the understanding that the space, in which people live, should be the primary focus of 
recovery”.11 Adding the experience from ABD in a non-conflict context, Harfst further broadens the 
definition and states that ABD can be defined as “targeting specific geographical areas in a country, 
characterised by a particular complex development problem, through an integrated, inclusive, 
participatory and flexible approach”.12 Given the complexity of certain developmental situations, ABD 
programmes typically intervene in multiple sectors and at multiple levels, involving multiple segments 
of society in an integrated manner. Its activities, however, are mainly confined to and target a specific 
geographical area. The main entry point for the programmes is the area of intervention.  
 
The main objectives of ABD are subsequently defined as i) helping to harmonize an immediate 
recovery response and a long-term development process, ii) addressing root causes of conflict, 
disaster or special developmental situations and iii) facilitating the establishment of foundations for 
political, legal, economic, social and administrative reforms that should prevent or mitigate the impact 
of future crises and contribute to sustainable development. There is however not a single model of 
area-based development with a predefined set of interventions. Rather, it is an approach under which 
an area is the main entry point – instead of a sector or a target group – and the specificity of each 
post-conflict or special developmental context determines the exact set of strategies, measures and 
activities included in the programme. Importantly, the approach also differentiates between what 
needs to be done and how it should be done, placing particular importance on the second aspect. 
 
The ABD approach is conceptually underpinned by several principles. In this approach, area and 
problem should be clearly linked, in other words the problem to be addressed by the intervention 
should define the geographical area of the intervention. The problem has to therefore be area-specific. 
The area of intervention is typically smaller than the country itself. According to Harfst, the 
application of the ABD approach is only appropriate if the problem can be realistically and effectively 
addressed at the level of the area.13 The approach is integrated in its nature meaning that it addresses 
the area-specific problems in a holistic manner taking into account, but also utilising, the complex 
interplay between sectors, factors and actors in a given area. This also means that even if the problem 
is sector-specific, addressing it through ABD requires a multi-sector approach. It is inclusive targeting 
‘communities’ rather than specific target groups within those communities.14 As a result, by targeting 
entire communities it is also non-discriminatory, a particularly important factor in conflict settings. In 
addition, the approach is participatory recognizing that the solution and the process leading to it, 
requires not only formal inclusion, but also the active participation of all relevant stakeholders in the 
area. In promoting inclusion and participation, the successful ABD approach therefore applies a 
bottom-up approach. Finally, this approach must be flexible and highly responsive to situational 
changes in the problem area keeping the intervention constantly relevant.  As briefly mentioned 
above, although traditionally applied mainly in conflict settings, in recent years the application of the 
approach has considerably broadened. Currently, the problems to be addressed through the ABD 
approach fall into four main categories: conflict-related including mainly pre and post-conflict 
situations affecting a specific area, post-war reconstruction including the reintegration of former 
combatants, refugees and IDPs and peace-building and reconciliation, disaster-related covering 
natural or man-made disasters in a specific area, exclusion-related dealing with excluded and 
marginalised groups and categories of population concentrated in a specific part of the country such 
as regional ethnic minorities and finally poverty-related reflecting the poverty situation emerging as a 
result of geographical isolation, climate, terrain, demography or economic restructuring. Arguably, the 
                                               
11 UNDP (2003), p. 2. 
12 Harfst (2006), p. 9.   
13 The study will examine this important aspect when assessing the ability of the ABD approach to address conflict 
characteristics in full complexity in chapter 5 and 6. 
14 Although the target communities are often selected due to the high prevalence of a particular disadvantaged group. 
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distinction between the various types is often difficult to make as they are closely interconnected. 
Conflict and natural disaster often generate marginalisation and poverty and inversely poverty, 
marginalisation and exclusion can often fuel the conflict. 
 
3. AREA-BASED DEVELOPMENT APPROACH AND CONFLICT LITERATURE  
 
The area-based development approach is considered to represent an appropriate instrument for 
conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction and has been extensively applied in conflict 
regions. In order to assess the appropriateness of the ABD approach in addressing conflict situations, 
the understanding of conflict, including its characteristics, conditions, underlying causes and 
dynamics, is of crucial importance. This part will therefore critically analyze the current academic 
discourse on conflict and its characteristics.15 As the area-based development approach is not the only 
possible response to conflict situations, the study will also briefly analyse other selected holistic 
approaches to conflict and reconstruction proposed by academic literature. Against this theoretical 
framework, it will conclude by assessing the capability of ABD to respond to conflict situations as well 
as its relation to other holistic responses to conflict and principles of reconstruction recommended by 
scholars. 
 
It is difficult to conceive of a human community where there is no conflict among members or 
between persons of the community and outsiders. At the same time, the degree to which conflict is 
physically violent varies widely.16  As conflict is endemic in human society and conflict of interests 
inheres in social life, all societies develop a range of norms and institutions to prevent the tension 
from developing into an open conflict between the groups or the groups and the government.17 These 
mechanisms usually work, but sometimes, under specific circumstances, they simply collapse. Better 
understanding of these crucial moments leading to conflict preoccupied academicians and political 
leaders throughout the history. 
 
A tremendously rich and also rather contradictory set of theories have been proposed to explain 
conflict characteristics whether they are called by various authors characteristics, conditions, 
underlying causes, contributing factors, or triggers. A comprehensive study of this academic writing 
led some scholars to the conclusion that i) there are no substantiated general theories of conflict, ii) 
most theories of conflict are rather vague, where the key variables, both the kind of violence as well as 
causal variables, tend to be defined in broad descriptive terms, leaving determining whether a specific 
case fits the descriptions rather arbitrary, and iii) with some important exceptions, efforts to test the 
theories empirically have been rather limited and characterized by ‘working backward’.18 As 
summarised by Gomes Porto in a recent study comprehensively reviewing academic literature related 
to conflict, although there have been considerable efforts invested into studying the causes and 
consequences of conflict, “far from being unified, the study of armed conflicts and war remains 
fragmented between disciplinary boundaries, which produce conflicting and often mutually exclusive 
theories”.19 However, despite these disagreements, the scholars agree that there are a certain set of 
conditions or factors, although often calling them differently, making certain regions, countries or 
areas more conducive to violent conflict.20 Secondly, the analysis clearly confirmed that the ‘tyranny 
                                               
15The findings of this part will also be used in the peace and conflict assessment in the context analyses of the case studies in 
chapter 4. 
16 Ross, M. H. (1986), A Cross-Cultural Theory of Political Conflict and Violence, Political Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 427-
468.    
17 Rule, J. (1988), Theories of Civil Violence, Barkley: University of California. 
18 See Rule, J. (1988). The full discussion of various theories and empirical results is beyond the scope of this study. Given the 
large number of variables considered, the study refers the reader to the cited sources for more information and further 
explanation.  
19 See Gomes Porto, J. (2002)  'Contemporary Conflict Analysis in Perspective’, in Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s 
Conflicts, Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman (Eds), Institute for Security Studies, pp. 1-49 . 
20 For example Kaldor lists the conditions conducive to conflict including a weak or failing state and weak civil society, 
dependence on external revenue sources, especially primary commodities, the erosion of monopoly of organized violence, the 
availability of small arms and unemployed young men, especially former soldiers and policemen, and the spread of an illegal 
7 
 
of the single-cause’ has been rejected and that there is now a broadly accepted understanding of the 
conflict as a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. Thus, conflict has been increasingly 
understood as multi-dimensional, multi-level and multi-stakeholder.  
 
In order to logically organise various characteristics and conditions of conflict as identified and 
discussed by academic literature, this study will use Brown’s categorisation and clustering of the main 
factors of conflict, dividing them into four categories, namely structural, political and governance, 
economic and social, and cultural and perceptual. It will also expand the matrix by adding as a 
separate category environmental factors, which have recently attracted scholarly attention.21 The 
summary of the categories is provided in table 1. The following paragraphs provide a brief description 
of the factors and summarize the academic discourse related to them.     
 
Table 1: Matrix of conflict characteristics/conditions as identified by academic literature. 
 
 
Structural factors 
 
 
Political and 
governance factors 
 
 
Economic and social  
factors 
 
Environmental factors 
 
 
Cultural and 
perceptual factors 
 
Role of neighbouring 
states/inter-state security 
concerns:  
- location in conflict-
prone neighbourhoods  
- undemocratic regions   
 
Ethnic geography: 
- high ethno-linguistic/ 
religious diversity 
- one dominant ethnic 
group  
 
History of conflict  
Mountainous country/ 
rough terrain 
Size of the population 
Strength of the military 
Illicit and criminal 
activities 
Availability of arms 
 
 
Weak state and rule of 
law: 
- undermined political 
authority  
- inability to exercise  
control and provide 
services  
 
Exclusionary national 
ideologies 
Identity, inter-group and 
elite politics  
Discriminatory political 
institutions: 
- participation in 
government 
- participation in army,    
policy and justice  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macro-economic 
problems: 
- failed macroeconomic 
policies   
- market access  
 
Low level, slow growth 
and structure of income  
Level of unemployment  
Existence of Diaspora 
Failure of social contract 
Vertical inequalities 
Horizontal economic 
inequalities: 
- discriminatory access 
to land, capital, 
government 
infrastructure, aid 
- discriminatory access 
to income, government 
and other elite 
employment, private 
employment 
Horizontal social 
inequalities:  
-   discriminatory access 
to (social) services 
such as education, 
health services, safe 
water, housing 
Male secondary education 
enrolment 
 
 
Natural resource 
endowment 
Scarcities of resources:  
- land, forest, water, 
energy, minerals, sea 
passage, fishing grounds 
 
Environmental degradation: 
- pollution, deforestation, 
land degradation  
 
Environmental 
externalities: 
- upstream river pollution 
- trans-boundary air 
pollution 
- illegal trade of waste 
 
 
Patterns of cultural 
discrimination: 
- legal and political 
constraints on use and 
teaching of minority 
language and related 
inequitable educational 
opportunities 
- religious freedom  
 
Problematic group 
histories and incendiary 
perceptions  
 
 
Structural factors. Structural factors suggested by various scholars include inter-state security 
concerns including location in war-prone neighbourhoods and undemocratic regions, mountainous 
country or rough terrain, size of the population, strength of the military and ethnic geography 
including high ethno-linguistic and religious diversity or one dominant ethnic group. Collier and 
Hoeffler discovered through their extensive econometric analysis that the risk of conflict is 
proportional to a country’s population suggesting that both opportunities and grievances increase 
with the size of the population. The tradition of conflict and time since a previous conflict as well as 
ethnic dominance, understood as one ethnic group being a majority constituting somewhere between 
                                                                                                                                                  
and informal economy, previous violence and proximity to conflict. All of these factors can be summarized as lack of human 
security. See Kaldor (2006), p. 21. 
21 Brown (1996), pp.12-22.  
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45% and 90% of the population also have a substantial effect on the risk of conflict.22 In their more 
recent work, they found out that social fragmentation, measured as ethnic and religious diversity, also 
significantly increases the risk of conflict.23 This new research also brought into significance two other 
factors – the proportion of the population made up of males in the age range 15-2924 and the 
proportion of the terrain of a country that is mountainous. A high ratio of military expenditures to 
national income is another significant factor in complex emergencies.25 One important factor, the role 
of neighbourhood states, has often been neglected. Refugee problems, economic problems such as 
disruption of regional trade, communication and production networks and military problems 
including use of a neighbouring state’s territory for shipment of arms and supplies and as a base for 
operation, can all significantly contribute to regional instability.26 
 
Political and governance factors. This category includes factors such as a weak state, exclusionary 
national ideologies and inter-group, elite and identity politics, and discriminatory political 
institutions. Weak or failing states, both from the perspective of political legitimacy and its capability 
to exercise control over the population and the overall territory under its jurisdiction and provide 
services for its citizens, is an important factor potentially contributing to conflict. Eroded elite and 
public confidence in the legitimacy and capability of government is one of the factors, which in 
combination with economic and social factors increases the probability of civil violence.27 
Emphasizing the importance of political factors and the weakness of the conventional economic 
explanation of inter-ethnic tensions, Horowitz in his influential work Ethnic Groups in Conflict argues 
that the emerging elite of a subordinate group often aspires not to economic power and business 
opportunities, but to political power.28 Violent escalation of conflict is therefore often related to the 
political system and in particular to the degree in which the institutions of government are 
discriminatory or based on exclusionary ideologies.29 Supporting this argument quantitatively, Hegre 
and Sambanis have confirmed that civil wars are more likely to occur in countries with recent political 
instability and inconsistent democratic institutions.30 Despite these strong and well substantiated 
propositions, the contribution of political factors to conflict is still one of the contested areas. In some 
academic literature, the degree of political right is repeatedly found to be either insignificant or to 
have an ambiguous effect on the risk of conflict, and in other studies it is suggested that the effect of 
political rights is non-monotonic, with anocracy more prone to conflict than democracy or an 
authoritarian regime.31  
 
Economic and social factors. This important and extensive category of conflict factors is in academic 
writing represented by failed macroeconomic policies, limited market access, low level and slow 
growth and structure of income, vertical inequalities such as income inequality, economic and social 
horizontal inequalities,32 failure of social contract, role of the Diaspora and male secondary education 
                                               
22 Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (2004) ‘Greed and Grievance of Civil War’, Oxford Economic Papers, 56(2004), Oxford University 
Press, pp. 563-595, Auvinen J.and E. W. Nafziger (1999) ‘The Source of Humanitarian Emergencies’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 43, No 3, June 1999, pp. 267-290.   
23 Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler, D. Rohner (2007) Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War, Department of 
Economics, Oxford University.   
24 Especially in combination with unemployment.  
25 Hegre, H. and N. Sambanis (2005) Sensitivity Analysis of the Empirical Literature on Civil War Onset, Paper presented to 
46th Annual Meeting of International Studies Association, Honolulu. This study also confirmed the importance of a tradition of 
violent conflict. 
26 See, for example, Brown (1996), Hegre and Sambanis (2005), Gomes Porto (2006), Kaldor (2007).  
27 Brown (1996), p. 13-16.; Nafziger, E., W. and J. Auvinen (2005) Economic Development, Inequality, War and State Violence, 
p. 33-34, in The Economics of Sustainable Developmnt, Sisay Asefa (Ed.), Michigan University.  
28 Horowitz, D. (1985) Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of California Press, 697 p.  
29 See, for example, Gomes Porto (2006); Gurr,T. R. and B. Harff (2003) Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Second Edition, 
Westview Press.  
30 Hegre and Sambanis (2005).   
31 Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (1998) ‘On Economic causes of Civil War’, Oxford Economic Papers, 50, 563-573, Oxford 
University Press and  Collier, Hoeffler (2004); Marshall, M., G. and T., R., Gurr (2005) Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global 
Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-determination Movements, and Democracy. Center for International Development and 
Conflict Management, University of Maryland, USA,92 p. 
32 Economic and social horizontal inequalities result from discriminatory economic systems including access to land, privately 
owned capital, government infrastructure, aid, access to income, government and other elite employment, private employment, 
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enrolment. Collier and Hoeffler, the main proponents of the economic or feasibility theory of conflict, 
suggest that economic factors such as the level, growth and structure of income are significant in the 
analysis of war initiation.33 Poorer countries, countries with low growth rates and a high proportion of 
primary commodity export in their GDP are more likely to experience war.34 Other significant factors 
are per capita income and male secondary education enrolment. Additionally, the Diaspora 
substantially increase the risk of conflict renewal, being a possible source of finance and having more 
sentimental views than the domestic population. An analysis of the relationship between 
humanitarian emergencies and their hypothesized sources in less-developed countries by Auvinen and 
Nafziger also confirms that stagnation and decline in real GDP, high income inequalities and a high 
ratio of military expenditure to national income are associated with the emergencies.35 One strongly 
contested issue is the effect of inequalities. Collier and Hoeffler after testing the robustness of their 
analyses, experimented with several other variables including income inequality and concluded that 
“there is insufficient data to introduce distributional considerations into the empirical analysis”.36 
There are however numerous other scholars who argue that economic inequalities, both horizontal 
and vertical, contribute to or cause conflict. For example, Nafziger and Auvinen used the Gini 
coefficient to measure income inequalities and were able to find the relationship between Gini and the 
war.37 Alesin and Perotti also argue that large income inequalities exacerbate the vulnerability of the 
population to humanitarian emergencies.38 As suggested by Stewart, the increase in perceived or 
absolute deprivation and the aspiration-achievement gap often results from specific vertical (class) or 
horizontal (regional, communal, group) inequalities. She further argues that these group motivations 
and horizontal inequalities are particularly important due to the fact that most internal conflicts 
consist of fighting between groups, where these groups are united in a common purpose. The group 
differences may therefore form a fundamental cause of war or conflict.39   
 
Environmental factors. Environmental variables are often underestimated. These factors can be 
broadly categorised into three groups including threats related to scarce resources, such as water, 
energy, sea passage and fishing grounds, to environmental externalities and those relating to social 
upheaval or environmental refugees. As already mentioned, the possession of natural resources can 
also be a significant conflict factor. Environmental externalities consist of issues such as upstream 
river and trans-boundary air pollution and illegal trade in toxic waste. Environmental refugees and 
social upheaval result from forced migration in response to ecological disaster or chronic shortage of 
natural resources.40 Although environmental factors rarely constitute the most decisive factor, they 
can contribute to civil violence, including insurgencies and ethnic clashes. In the future, the incidence 
of such violence will most likely increase as progressing climate change, population growth, economic 
development and pollution may lead to increased scarcity of agricultural land, freshwater and forest in 
many areas, especially of the developing world.  
 
Finally cultural and perceptual factors. These include patterns of cultural discrimination, inequitable 
educational opportunities, legal and political constraints on the use and teaching of minority 
                                                                                                                                                  
unemployment, as well as discriminatory access to social services namely access to education, health services, safe water and 
housing. 
33 Collier and Hoeffler (2004). However, as some specialists in ethnic conflict strongly argue (see, for example, Walker Connor 
(1994) Ethnonationalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press), the exact links between economic grievances and ethnic 
conflict are vague, variable and strongly conditioned by other non-economic factors. 
34 Contrary, Hegre, Sambanis (2005) found out that there is only a weak association between civil war and oil export 
dependence, while other commonly used measures of resource-dependence are not significant.       
35 Auvinen and Nafziger (1999).     
36 Collier and Hoeffler (1998). 
37 Nafziger and Auvinen (2005).  
38 Alesin, A. and R. Perotti (1996) ‘Income Distribution, Political Instability and Investment’, European Economic Review, 40 
(1996), pp. 1203-1228.   
39 See Stewart, F. (2004) Development and Security, Working paper 3, CRISE, University of Oxford, Stewart, F. (2005) Policies 
Towards Horizontal Inequalities in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, CRISE Working paper 7, University of Oxford, and Stewart, 
F. and G. Brown, A. Langer (2007) Policies towards Horizontal Inequalities, CRISE Working Paper No. 42, University of 
Oxford. 
40 See, for example, Rawabizambuga, A (2007) ‘Environmental Security and Development’, Conflict, Security & Development, 
7:1, p. 201-225.; Gomes Porto (2006). On the possession of natural resources and conflict see also Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 
2004).  
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languages, religious freedom as well as problematic group histories and incendiary perceptions.41 
Many of these issues are interconnected with structural, political and social factors and horizontal 
inequalities discussed above. These factors, often present in the Western Balkans, re-emerged after 
the collapse of the federal Yugoslavia as part of a complex, and until now incomplete, nation building 
process. The region is therefore ‘over-populated’ by often mutually excluded historical and cultural 
myths.      
 
Other important conflict characteristics. Globally there was an increase in the total magnitude of 
violent conflicts within societies from the 1950’s to the 1980’s, with a sharp decline after the Cold War 
end in 1991, while the ‘internal or societal conflicts’ represented roughly three times the magnitude of 
interstate wars, increasing six-fold between the 1950’s and early the 1990’s.42 In Europe and the CIS, 
despite a shift towards containment and settlement, there were still 32 armed and other self-
determination conflicts between 1955 and 2004 (out of which, 23 took place after 1990 and 11 in the 
Western Balkans).43 What is important for this study, is that most of these conflicts have taken place 
in a specific region or an area of the country, in other words the recent conflicts in Europe and the CIS 
are increasingly localised, justifying and allowing for the application of an area-specific approach. 
Simultaneously, as indicated above, the contemporary internal conflicts involve complex trans-
national connections with blurred distinctions between internal and external, aggression and 
repression, or even between local and global.44 Another important characteristic is the dynamic 
nature of conflict. The internal dynamics of conflict change over time in response to altered 
circumstances. Although sometimes this dynamic may be a rather linear progression from 
conventional politics, to militancy, armed conflict, negotiation and settlement, more often conflicts 
are neither linear nor necessarily progressive, and they may alter as a response to repressive or 
progressive policies, new leadership or external influences. It is therefore often difficult to distinguish 
between different phases of conflict as there are no clear beginnings and endings and the factors and 
conditions that cause conflict as described in table 1 are interconnected and may decrease or 
exacerbate during and after periods of violence. As argued in academic literature, the intervention 
should therefore respond to this dynamism and represent a continuum of phases involving both 
elements of conflict prevention and reconstruction.45  
 
Specifically for Europe and the CIS, the historical and structural characteristics of conflicts in the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslav successor states reflect some specific dysfunctionalities of socialist and 
post-socialist federalism.  These include resentments generated by the arbitrary drawing of borders by 
imperial powers in Central Asia, the Western CIS, the South Caucasus and also in the Western 
Balkans. These resentments were complemented by the common convictions that federal states 
always provided more benefits to a different ethnic group to ones own, the use of ethnic identity for 
political mobilisation during post-socialist elections and the post-independence creation of ethnic 
minorities just across the border from countries where the same nationality make up the titular 
majority. Other important factors are associated with a triple transition that most of the newly 
independent states had to undergo, including democratization – a process of transition from 
totalitarian society and dictatorship to democracy,46 marketization – a shift from a centrally planned 
to a market-oriented economy, and nation-state building. The last category in particular has become a 
more problematic issue than originally envisaged by the transition paradigm and is rather specific for 
the transition countries of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Interaction of these three parallel 
processes has often led to the creation of a weak state, where many of the conflict characteristics and 
factors presented in table 1 are simultaneously present.     
                                               
41 Brown (1996), pp. 20-22.    
42Gurr, T. R. and M. G. Marshall, and D. Khosla (2001) Peace and Conflict 2001: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self- 
determination Movements and Democracy, Centre for International Development and Conflict Management, University of 
Maryland, pp. 7-8. 
43 Marshall and Gurr (2005), pp. 84-85, 90-91.   
44Kaldor (2007), p. 2. 
45 See, for example,  Marshall and Gurr (2005); Kaldor, M. (2007a) Human Security, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 185.  
46 The often automatic assumption of the direction and character of this transition is now increasingly contested in academic 
literature and challenged by the practical reality of many transition countries , for more see for example Carothers, T. (2002) 
‘The End of Transitional Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, 13.1, (2002), pp. 5-21.       
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Other approaches to conflict and post-conflict reconstruction recommended by academic literature.  
In response to conflict as a complex phenomenon, where a simple rank ordering exercise may fail to 
capture its complexity, various scholars proposed to design the response to a conflict situation as a 
multifaceted intervention with efforts targeting the structural, political, economic, social and 
perceptual characteristics of conflict. It is proposed that these responses should include a series of 
sustained, long-term interventions. Due to the dynamic character of conflict, the responses and 
policies should also differentiate between conflict prevention and post-conflict peace building.47 
 
Academic literature further argues that reconstruction should be increasingly focused on rebuilding a 
formal political economy and reversing negative social and economic relationships. Priority has to be 
given to the restoration of infrastructure and the provision of basic services to the local population, the 
adoption of appropriate forms of governance and market relations, the establishment of law and order 
and support to education and the media. This focus on the multi-dimensional character of 
intervention is especially important because the action to remedy underlying problems like poverty, 
inequality and weak states have frequently been very limited in the post-conflict period.48 
Reconstruction is increasingly conceptualized as a strategy to achieve peace rather than something 
that should be implemented once peace is achieved. It is increasingly argued that political, economic 
and security issues have to be integrated into a new type of humanistic global policy. Any policy 
towards conflict therefore needs to be holistic, involving military and political, civil and legal and 
economic and social approaches.49 
 
The academic literature also advocates for increased localisation, decentralisation, and a 
participatory character of the interventions. The decentralization and encouragement of local 
initiatives and use of local specialists should promote the use of local knowledge and experience. The 
encouragement of a wide-ranging local debate should lead to increased transparency, reduced 
corruption and risk of political instrumentalisation of the initiatives and eventually to strengthened 
civic engagement. Some scholars argue that post-conflict reconstruction and development face many 
of the same issues and challenges: building on what exists and tapping into in-country expertise, 
accurately assessing the social, political and institutional landscape and adjusting strategies to fit local 
circumstances.50 Many of the recommendations for development in a non-conflict context would be 
applicable in a post-conflict setting as well. Stiefel even proposes that the key lesson of the War Torn 
Societies Project is that the challenge of rebuilding after the war is essentially a developmental 
challenge in the special circumstances of a war-torn society. This project further emphasized, 
supporting the point made in previous paragraphs, that “local solutions and responses to rebuilding 
challenges are often more effective, cheaper and more sustainable”, emphasizing the importance of an 
intimate knowledge and understanding of local and national actors, forces and dynamics and allowing 
for flexibility and delegation of authority.51 
 
Additionally, Bakarat and Chard refer to the “fundamental contradiction between prescriptive time-
limited interventions geared to produce rapid, visible transformation and the need for time, open-
ended dialogue, experimentation and learning that is required in the process of restoring the 
institutional life of peoples devastated by misfortune”. This fixed-term, pre-planned project culture is 
particularly unsuited to the conflict circumstances, allowing no space for solutions to evolve with 
recovery, where people recovering their confidence increasingly understand changing circumstances, 
identify possible courses of action and become more able to make choices and decisions.52 
 
                                               
47 See, for example, Brown (1996); Collier, P. (2006) Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implication for Policy, 
Department of Economics, Oxford University.   
48 Keen (2007), p. 188. 
49 Kaldor (2007), p 145; Kaldor, M. at al (2006), p. 21. 
50 Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2005) ‘Rebuilding Governance in Failed States and Post-conflict Societies: Core Concepts and Cross-
cutting Themes, Public Administration and Development, 25, 3-14, p. 9.  
51 Stiefel, M. (1999) Rebuilding After War. Learning from War-torn Societies Projects, WSP/PSIS, Geneva.  
52 Bakarat, S. and M. Chard (2002) ‘Theories, rhetoric and practice: recovering the capacity of war-torn societies’, Third World 
Quarterly, Vol 23, No 5, pp. 817-835.      
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Rondinelli and Montgomery in the context of successful nation-building propose that the recovery 
programmes should focus not only on restoring governance, but also on the long-term goals of 
developing human capital, reducing poverty, promoting social equality and alleviating social problems 
while at the same time strengthening the economy and rebuilding the state. This often requires 
unusual degrees of innovations and improvisation and application of the lessons flexibly, creatively 
and with sensitivity to local conditions.53 In moving to models, strategies and doctrines, it is important 
to base them solidly on an understanding of the particular dynamics of the country and to leave 
sufficient policy and operational space for flexibility and learning.54 
 
Some of these principles were translated into more practical approaches proposed by academics and 
integrating security and development. The concept of European Zones of Human Security is for 
example proposed as a European Union strategy for tackling a nexus of non-traditional security 
challenges by applying the principles of the Human Security Doctrine for Europe.55 The significant 
feature of the approach is that the nature of the zones is contractual, between the EU and the local 
partners. The European Zones of Human Security are defined as economic (recovering productive 
capacity, providing social protection, improving infrastructure), normative (introducing European-
type norms and practices), social, cultural (creating a supportive cultural and social environment) and 
security and are based on the six principles of a human security approach,56 namely the primacy of 
human rights, legitimate political authority, bottom up approach, effective multilateralism, an 
integrated regional approach and finally a clear and transparent strategic direction.  
 
Conflict literature and ABD. Referring to the conflict matrix in table 1, ABD is well positioned to 
respond to the multi-dimensional characteristic of conflict. Its integrated character allows for 
addressing a whole range of sectoral issues in a holistic way. Conceptually, the approach is designed to 
be able to deal simultaneously with a set of interrelated political, economic, social and environmental 
issues. It is especially well equipped to do so at the sub-national – regional and local – levels. 
Conversely, the approach is only partially suited to deal with other influential factors of conflict, 
namely the structural factors and the national and cross-border dimensions of most other factors. This 
leaves its ability to comprehensively respond to the multi-level characteristic of conflict in question. 
As far as another important conflict characteristic recognized by academic literature, its dynamic 
nature, is concerned, the ABD approach is again well equipped to respond to it. Here, the flexibility 
and often long-term approach create conditions for the implementation of a continuum of 
interventions targeting various phases of conflict and involving both elements of prevention and 
reconstruction. 
 
As far as the ability of developmental activities to address conflict characteristics is concerned, the 
specific components of ABD programmes described in chapter 2 such as an emphasis on human 
rights, governance, support to basic services and infrastructure, social development and assistance, 
local economic development, community empowerment, institutional and policy reform and tolerance 
promotion, if appropriately integrated in multi-dimensional and multi-level interventions, have a 
potential to positively address many of the conflict factors described in this chapter. Some significant 
limitations will nevertheless be discussed in chapters 5 and 6.  
 
How does ABD correspond to other responses to conflict and principles of reconstruction suggested 
by academic literature? There are a  growing number of scholars emphasizing the necessity of 
addressing conflict, especially the set of conditions conducive to conflict, simultaneously through a 
                                               
53 Rondinelli, D. and J. Montgomery (2005) ‘Regime Change and Nation Building: Can Donors Restore Governance in Post-
conflict States?, Public Administration and Development, 25, pp. 15-23.  
54 Brinkerhoff (2005), p. 11.   
55 Kostovicova, D. and P. Seifert, V. Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2007) European Zones of Human Security; A Proposal for the European 
Union, CSGG, London School of Economics, London, p. 2. For more on human security and the Human Security Doctrine for 
Europe see, for example,  A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, The Barcelona Report on the Study Group on Europe’s 
Security Capabilities, Barcelona, 2004; Kaldor, M. (2007b) ‘Human Security in the Balkans’, SudostEuropa Mitteilungen, 
01/2007, and Kaldor, M. and M. Martin, S. Selchow (2007). 
56 See A European Way of Security, Madrid Report on the Human Security Study Group, Proposal and Background Report, 
Madrid, November 2007, pp. 4-5.  
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multi-dimensional and holistic intervention involving military, political, economic and social aspects, 
while recognising the importance of a multi-level and multi-actor character of the response. Academic 
literature also advocates that reconstruction has to represent a non-prescriptive open-ended dialogue 
leaving sufficient space for operational and policy flexibility and learning. This corresponds to the 
principle that there is not a single model of area-based development with a predefined set of 
interventions. Rather the specificity of each post-conflict or special developmental context determines 
the exact set of strategies, measures and activities included in the programme. Similarly to ABD, 
several scholars suggested that the response should concentrate on the local level. It is believed that 
this localised approach would allow for the intimate knowledge and understanding of local actors, 
partners and dynamics, a more appropriate response to complex and fast changing local conditions 
and would create the right framework for modelling and experimentation. The very character of an 
ABD approach, as localised, participatory, inclusive and flexible in nature appropriately corresponds 
to this academic discourse. In addition, arguably, the integrated response encompassing a range of 
complex security, political, economic and social issues is more manageable and therefore more 
effective if implemented on a smaller scale. Finally, the necessity of long-term efforts stressed by 
various scholars can also be built into ABD design as well. On the other hand, due to its predominant 
focus on a selected area, the ABD approach may have limited ability to sufficiently take into 
consideration some other aspects recommended by academic literature such as an emphasis on 
reflecting the broader context and responding to cross-border and national considerations as well as 
working with, or even creating, legitimate political authority especially at a national level.   
 
 
4. AREA-BASED DEVELOPMENT APPROACH – CONFLICT MITIGATION IN PRACTICE 57  
  
For both case studies, South Serbia and Southwest Serbia (Sandzak), the methodological approach 
includes a situation analysis, a critical assessment of conflict mitigation contributions of the area-
based development programme and a summary of identified strengths and limitations. The peace and 
conflict assessment section of the context analyses is based on the findings of chapter 3, it in 
particular uses the matrix of conflict characteristics and conditions of conflict, with a special emphasis 
on the horizontal inequalities in South Serbia.58 The case studies have been selected as representative 
for ABD application in conflict settings, where the purpose of an intensive study of the cases is to shed 
light on a larger class of cases. This is also essential for process tracing and understanding of 
causalities.59 Both cases can be considered as typical examples of ABD programmes as they were 
developed at a later stage of the ABD evolution and thus were informed by lessons learned from 
previous applications. The South Serbia Programme has been one of the case studies based on which 
UNDP consolidated the ABD definition and principles and defined the role of its approach in UNDP 
programming.60 The Southwest Serbia programme was subsequently designed largely based on the 
experience and lessons learned from South Serbia. As for the differences between the two case studies 
as described in detail in the following paragraphs, the conflict context of the two regions differ as one 
programme is implemented in a post-conflict setting with latent tensions and the other in a region 
characterised by low-scale incidents of violence with a potential for future escalation. Moreover, the 
South Serbia conflict can be predominantly characterised as inter-ethnic and the conflict in Southwest 
Serbia is in its nature intra-ethnic. This difference should allow for illustrating potential differences in 
the application of the approach in different types and phases of conflict. The generalisation based on 
the empirical evidence of two case studies is further validated through a questionnaire survey among 
ABD practitioners from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Ukraine.  
                                               
57 This chapter is a modified version of Nyheim, D. and R. Vrbensky (2007) Conflict Mitigation Mission Report South Serbia, 
UNDP Serbia, and Nyheim, D. and R. Vrbensky (2007) Conflict Assessment Mission Report Southwest Serbia, UNDP Serbia. 
The data included in the study reflects the timing of two conflict mitigation missions (South Serbia mission in September 2007 
and Southwest Serbia mission in December 2007), some data was updated in March 2008.       
58 See Stewart (2004). 
59 For more on the selection of case studies see, for example, Gerring, J. (2007) Case Study Research: Principles and Practices, 
Cambridge University Press or Flyvbjerg B. (2006) ‘Five Misunderstandings about Case-study Research’, Qualitative Inquire, 
Volume 12, No. 2, pp. 219-245.   
60 For more see UNDP/RBEC (2003) ‘Main Outcomes’ and ‘Cover Note’ of Area-based Development Practitioners Workshop, 
Crimea, Ukraine, 29-31 October 2003 or Harfst (2006), p. 9. 
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CASE STUDY OF SOUTH SERBIA   
 
Context analysis. The South Serbia region, consisting of the Pcinjski and Jablonicki districts, is 
located in the Republic of Serbia and borders Kosovo to the west, Macedonia to the south and Bulgaria 
to the southeast. This region, which has Serbia’s largest concentration of ethnic Albanians has been 
due to recent positive but still unfinished developments labelled by the International Crises Group ‘a 
still incomplete Balkan success story’. It is argued that since the international and Serbian 
government diplomacy resolved an ethnic Albanian insurgency in 2001, donors and the Government 
in Belgrade have invested significant resources and effort to undo a legacy of human rights violations 
and improve the economy. As a result, the tensions have significantly decreased, major human rights 
violations have ended, the army and police are more sensitive to Albanian concerns and there is also 
some progress in other areas, such as a multi-ethnic police force, integration of the judiciary, and use 
of Albanian language books in schools. Ethnic Albanians increasingly show their desire to develop 
their own political identity inside Serbia and cohabit with Serbs.61  
 
South Serbia’s Albanian population is concentrated in the municipalities of Presevo and Bujanovac, 
both with an Albanian majority, and Medvedja (the Presevo Valley).62 Traditionally, but increasingly 
since the early 1990s, ethnic Albanians were underrepresented in the state administration and 
enterprises that were the main employers in the region and were almost completely absent from the 
police and judiciary. This discrimination exacerbated tensions associated with poverty and 
unemployment, particularly in rural parts of the South Serbia region. In an unofficial referendum in 
1992 the majority of ethnic Albanians expressed the desire that this part of South Serbia should 
become part of Kosovo. As a result of this situation and the increased abuse and harassment from the 
Yugoslav security forces and encouraged by the successes of the Kosovo Liberation Army in 
neighbouring Kosovo, Albanian insurgents of the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and 
Bujanovac (UCPMB) started to fight Yugoslav security forces in 2000. The insurgency lasted for 18 
months during 2000-2001,63 and resulted in some 100 casualties and around 12,500 Albanians 
leaving the area. Attacks on Yugoslav police and military patrols by small groups of UCPMB fighters, 
who then took refuge in the ‘ground safety zone’,64 were common features of the conflict. The signing 
of the Konculj peace agreement in May 2001 essentially halted the fighting, although isolated 
incidents of violence continued until the end of 2004.65 
 
Responding to the crisis, in 2000 the Serbian Government established the Coordination Body initially 
managing the counter-insurgence, but after the Konculj Agreement becoming responsible for the 
implementation of the Covic Plan, the strategy towards the normalisation of the region masterminded 
and led by the then Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic. Initially, the Coordination Body had a 
decisive influence on all political, social and cultural events, later as the situation normalised and also 
due to changes in the leadership, its influence has decreased. The Government’s effort was 
complemented by the international community, especially the United Nations, which, by the end of 
2001 established an inter-agency office in South Serbia and initiated the implementation of the South 
Serbia Municipal Improvement and Recovery Programme (SSMIRP) and the Rapid Employment 
Programme (REP). Addressing the most pressing legacies of the conflict, REP provided temporary 
public works employment for some 6,000 former fighters and the long-term unemployed during an 
18-month period. Although a very few long term jobs have been created, the objective immediately 
after the conflict was to engage people quickly, generate income and get majority of them off the 
                                               
61 International Crisis Group (ICG) (2006) Southern Serbia: In Kosovo’s Shadow, Policy Briefing, Europe Briefing N°43, 
Belgrade/Pristina/Brussels, 27 June 2006, 17 p.  
62 The ethnic composition in Presevo is 31,098 (89.1%) Albanians, 2,984 (8.5%) Serbs, and 322 (0.9%) Roma, in Bujanovac, 
23,681 (54.7%) Albanians, 14,782 (34.1%) Serbs and 3,867 (8.9%) Roma, and in Medvedja 2,816 (26.2%) Albanians, 7,163 
(66.6%) Serbs, and 109 (1%) Roma (See Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (2002) Report CH31, No.  295). 
63 This took place after the Kosovo conflict and roughly simultaneously with the Albanian insurgency in neighbouring 
Macedonia. 
64  An area inside Serbia, but barred to the Yugoslav forces. 
65 The history and international responses are based on Thorogood, T. (2007) ‘The South Serbia Programme: Lessons in 
Conflict Prevention and Recovery’, Development&Transition, No. 6, April 2007, UNDP/LSE.    
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streets contributing to prevent a further outbreak of violence. This goal has been achieved. SSMIRP 
then focused on longer-term issues such as support of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
needed for conflict resolution and civil society development, more systemic employment creation and 
better local governance. This included the establishment of small funds administered by 
municipalities that delivered grants to NGOs from the region and support to development of farmers 
groups and cooperatives. 
 
The South Serbia programme has benefited from the effective division of labour among the 
international agencies active in the region, where UNDP has focused on supporting governance, civil 
society and to a lesser degree local economic development, OSCE has taken a leading role on judicial 
and police reform. Likewise, the monitoring of the security situation has fallen under the mandate of 
the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM). While areas of overlap have been present, for 
instance between UNDP and USAID initiatives, these have been increasingly addressed in a 
coordinated manner. The strong donor support in the period 2001-2005 resulted in various UNDP-
implemented initiatives delivering 10.5 million Euro from the European Union and $3.5 million from 
other donors such as the World Bank and the Governments of the Netherlands, Luxembourg and 
Sweden. The existing Municipal Improvement and Revival Programme Phase II (MIR II) began in 
December 2005 with a budget of 10.2 million Euro and is supported by a consortium of partners 
consisting of the European Union through the European Agency for Reconstruction, the Governments 
of Sweden, Norway and Austria and the Government of Serbia. The programme also benefited from 
significant contributions by the local municipalities. This successful coordination among partners has 
helped to ensure funding continuity since 2001 and prevented the appearance of serious funding and 
implementation gaps.  
 
Conflict and peace dynamics in South Serbia are rooted in several inequalities, including political 
representation and participation, economic inequality, and access to social and other services found at 
the inter-community, inter-municipality, and inter-regional/national levels. These in turn are affected 
by positive and negative contextual factors. The scheme in annex I provides a general overview of all 
these, a detailed description is included in the paragraphs below.    
 
Inequalities in political representation and participation.  As a result of the last municipal elections, 
most municipal councils now in general reflect the ethnic composition of their municipalities, 
although in most cases the Roma are still largely under-represented. Today, the inequalities at 
municipal level are visible predominantly in the police and judiciary and this is despite progress with 
the inter-ethnic police initiative led by OSCE and the appointment of the first Albanian judge in 
Bujanovac. In the Municipal Courts of Bujanovac and Presevo, Albanians constitute 11% and 27.5% 
respectively of the staff.66  Out of ten judges in the Bujanovac Municipal Court and seven judges in the 
Criminal Court, only two are Albanian.67 In the police administration, out of 38 employees, there are 
two Albanians in Bujanovac, with no Albanian police commanders.  A similar picture is reported in 
the border police and customs where there are only two Albanian employees out of over 100 staff. At 
the railway border control in Presevo, there is presently one Albanian employee out of 40 staff.68 
According to Albanian political leaders, further inequalities are seen in employment opportunities in 
public institutions (such as post, public utilities, forestry) in some parts of the region.  For example, in 
Bujanovac 5% of employees in public institutions are stated to be Albanian. At the same time, the 
situation in Presevo is more balanced and employment in such institutions roughly reflects the 
composition of the population. It is important to note that in 2005 the Ministry of Justice approved 
the official use of the Albanian language in the Municipal Courts, and in February 2006, an Albanian 
magistrate started work in the Bujanovac Municipal Court. It is clear that an improvement in the 
above-described situation would require a systemic change in management of the respective sectors at 
a national level.    
 
                                               
66 Council for Human Rights (2006) Inception Report on Implementation of ‘Free Legal Assistance’ in Bujanovac and Presevo 
Municipalities. Bujanovac. 
67 Interviews with Albanian political leaders in Bujanovac. 
68 Interviews with Albanian political leaders in Bujanovac and Presevo. 
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Even more significant inequalities are found at the inter-municipal and inter-regional levels.  In the 
Coordination Body, which was created also to support the integration of Albanians in state 
institutions, the representation and participation of Albanians has been more formal than effective.  
For example, although Albanian mayors were appointed as the Vice Presidents in the Coordination 
Body after restructuring in 2005, they have not been effectively included in decision-making.  It is 
likely that another reorganization of the Coordination Body in 2007, with no consultation of Albanian 
mayors, may lead to even more limited participation. Access to higher level decision-makers in the 
state structures by minority leaders has been limited. In the context of actual and perceived 
discrimination, the inability to secure meetings with ministers is seen by many as a slight. Although 
Albanian political parties have boycotted national elections since 1990, their participation in the 
parliamentary elections in 2007 resulting in the election of an Albanian MP to the Parliament is a 
positive development, allowing for the presentation of Albanian issues and demands in the 
Parliament. 
 
Economic inequalities. The overall economic situation in South Serbia is affected by political 
instability and years of underinvestment by the state.  Poverty among the population is fuelled by high 
levels of unemployment and a challenging business environment. Unemployment figures are 
unreliable, with available data indicating rates between 25%-30%.69  These figures are considered as 
underestimated, with local NGOs and leaders often stating that rates are more in the range of 60-70%, 
indicating also the size of the informal economy.70  Whereas all communities are adversely affected by 
regional underdevelopment, there are still a number of visible economic inequalities. At an inter-
community level, inequalities are visible in access to employment in public institutions, as mentioned 
above and socially owned enterprises.  For the latter, reliable figures are difficult to find.  Nonetheless, 
the evidence indicates that there is widespread actual as well as perceived discrimination. For 
example, interviewees stated that the company HEBA in Bujanovac employs 500 Serbs out of a total 
workforce of 518,71 while the tobacco factory in Bujanovac has reportedly only five Albanians out of 
200 employees.  There is also evidence to suggest that in some socially owned enterprises in Albanian 
dominated municipalities, despite the availability of the local work force, Serbian employees are 
transported to work from the regional centre, the city of Vranje.  Conversely, however, the company 
Moravia in Presevo employs 41 Albanians of a total of 47 employees.72 Employment inequalities in 
socially owned enterprises are compounded by a slow and often non-transparent privatization 
process.  For example, according to the mayor of Bujanovac only two out of ten socially owned 
enterprises have been privatized so far. At the same time, remittances from Albanians abroad have 
mitigated the level of income disparities that would normally follow such a situation.73 It is important 
to stress that the unemployment picture has also strong gender dimensions.  Several NGO 
respondents stated that unemployment among Albanian women can be as high as 70%, as compared 
to 30% among Serb women, while Roma women were said to have even higher unemployment rates 
than Albanian (although the involvement of women in household work cannot be considered as 
unemployment). Gender-disaggregated unemployment figures are not available. A range of cultural 
explanations for these differing employment rates were offered, but also a picture of discrimination at 
home, with evidence of significant gender-based violence. 
 
At an inter-municipality and inter-regional level, inequalities are seen in differing levels of state 
allocations and investment. This may in part be explained by the differences in funding channels, 
where Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja access the state resources predominantly through the 
Coordination Body, whereas other municipalities receive limited allocations from the Coordination 
Body (only around 310,3 million Dinars in total), but have a possibility to access significant funding 
                                               
69 Council for Human Rights (2006). 
70 Interviews with local NGOs and Albanian and Serbian political leaders. 
71 ICG (2007) Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley, Europe Report N°186, Belgrade/Pristina/Brussels, 16 October 
2007, 23 p.  
72 Interviews with Albanian and Serbian political leaders. 
73 Outmigration in Bujanovac is estimated in the range of 10 700 migrants, whereas in Presevo it is 12 500 migrants. 
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through other channels.74 The decision-making behind allocations by the Coordination Body is rather 
unclear and differences in allocations may compound perceptions of discrimination. 
 
Taking the region as a whole, there are another set of observed inequalities. According to official 
statistics, GDP per capita in 2005 was in Presevo 20,713 Dinars, in Bujanovac 39,769 Dinars and in 
Medvedja 28,185 Dinars as compared to the Serbian national average of 144,109 Dinars and for 
example in the regional centre Vranje with 125,049 Dinars. On the other hand some other 
municipalities in South Serbia have recorded very low GDP as well, for instance Bosilegrad with 
29,993 Dinars and Trgoviste 39,211 Dinars. The official realised investment per capita (without 
private ownership) in 2005 was in Presevo only 162 Dinars as compared to the Serbian average of 
21,980 Dinars and to Vranje of 28,550 Dinars.75 The average monthly salary per employee in February 
2008 was in Serbia 43,218 Dinars, in Vojvodina 44,394 and in Central Serbia 42,787, however in the 
Jablanicki and Pcinjski districts it was only 29,495 and 31,367 Dinars respectively. The average 
monthly salary in Presevo is 31,242 Dinars, in Bujanovac 31,924 Dinars and Medvedja 27,810 Dinars 
only.76 According to the official governmental categorisation of the municipalities, all Albanian 
municipalities are categorised as extremely underdeveloped, together with other South Serbia 
municipalities of Bojnik, Bosilegrad, Crna Trava and Trgoviste. Among 12 municipalities included in 
this category in total, only 4 are outside of multi-ethnic regions. The multi-ethnic municipality of 
Tutin in Southwest Serbia is also in this category.77          
 
Access to social services.  Access to social services such as education, health, water, sewage, and waste 
management has generally improved in the region, however when compared to other regions of the 
country the situation remains unfavourable. With an exception of Roma communities, where the 
situation is still largely unimproved, inequalities in access to services across communities are less 
significant, with a visible exception in the education and health sectors.78 In education, inequalities 
relate to the absence of Albanian-language curricula and teaching materials, where only books from 
Kosovo are available. There are also problems in recognizing university diplomas obtained in Kosovo 
and Macedonia, as well as limited faculty for teaching in Albanian-language schools. Having said that, 
when designing the policies for education in minority languages, the issue of ‘self-imposed’ 
segregation and potential future discrimination on the labour market connected with insufficient 
knowledge of the Serbian language needs to be seriously taken into consideration. Municipal health 
facilities in Presevo and Bujanovac are accessed by all communities, although health care outreach is 
limited in rural areas and for Roma communities in general. Inequalities are more visible on an inter-
municipal and inter-regional level. Difficulties are still experienced by Albanians in particular when 
accessing services outside their municipalities and in accessing higher education outside of the region. 
This is often caused by language barriers, economic obstacles and also the fear of discrimination. In 
terms of social services in general, levels of access and quality are lower than the national average due 
to the previous chronic underinvestment in the region.  
 
                                               
74 The official figures for allocations from the Coordination Body across selected municipalities in 2000-2005 were 861,110,329 
Dinars or  25,029/per capita in Presevo, 907,796,929 Dinars or 21,445/per capita in Bujanovac and 1,248,442,411 Dinars or 
123,755/per capita in Medvedja. See, for comparison, the ethnic composition of municipalities in footnote 59. For more 
information see Coordination Body for Municipalities Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja (2006)  Coordination Body – 5 Year 
of Work, Government of Serbia, Belgrade and Council for Human Rights. 
75 Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (2006) Municipalities in Serbia 2006, Development indicators, Belgrade. 
76 Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (2008) Communication Number 71: Salaries and wages per employee - February 
2008 
- Republic of Serbia by districts and municipalities, Statistics of Employment, Issue LVIII.  
77 Government categorisation according to Official Gazette of RS, No. 53/95.   
78 The disaggregated regional data for the Roma population is not available, however the situation of Roma in various parts of  
the Republic of Serbia is comparable. The literacy rate among the Roma population is 84 percent (in comparison to 97 percent 
of the domicile of non-Roma living in their close proximity), 74 percent of Roma are enrolled in primary schools and only 19 
percent in secondary schools (in comparison to 97 and 71 percent respectively of the domicile of non-Roma). The 
unemployment rate among Roma is 39 percent (in comparison to 15 percent of the domicile of non-Roma). For more see UNDP 
(2006) At Risk: The Social Vulnarability of Roma, refugees and Internally Displaced persons in Serbia, Belgrade and 
Argument – Research and Analytical Center (2006) Local Needs in Roma Education in South Serbia Pcinjski and Jablanicki 
District, Belgrade. 
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Contextual factors. Contextual factors that influence the situation in South Serbia are both negative 
and positive and can be grouped into four clusters, namely security, political, economic, and social. As 
far as security issues are concerned, South Serbia remains militarized following the 1999 conflict in 
Kosovo and the local insurgency in 2000/2001. The significant presence of military and security 
personnel remains a point of inter-community contention. Illicit cross-border activities such as 
smuggling, armed groups, banditry and until recently the unclear status of Kosovo as well as the 
developments related to the declaration of Kosovo independence on 17 February 2008 are other 
important drivers. However, inter-community relations in this context have remained relatively stable 
in part due to conflict fatigue and weariness, as well as the strong involvement of the international 
community. Generalizing this point, it seems that ‘the fatigue-based stability’ often provides 
opportunity and momentum for the creation of ‘the development-based stability’. In the economic 
sphere, the difficult and complex transition process in South Serbia is further complicated by a history 
of underinvestment, the poor state of physical and social infrastructure, the collapse of socially owned 
enterprises and brain-drain through out-migration. The consequences are seen in limited business 
opportunities and the lack of private investment. Deterioration of economic conditions is counter-
balanced by a significant inflow of remittances by the Albanian Diaspora and recently increased 
investment both by the state and international community. 
 
For the social issues, the formation and entrenchment of separate identities is driven by numerous 
factors.  These include separate educational systems and limited opportunities for social interaction, 
through for example sports, culture, and religion.  In combination with provocations and symbolic 
actions, including activities of gendarmerie and Albanian flag-raising and a polarized media that fuels 
distrust, this may increasingly set the stage for future polarization of communities.  At the same time, 
it is important to stress that positive inter-community relations remain, resulting from a long history 
of peaceful coexistence and day-to-day interactions. Finally, the political issues reflect the problematic 
political management of the region. On the one hand, inconsistency in the government’s political 
approach, policies and their practical implementation contributes, whether by default or by design, to 
a challenging security, economic and social environment. It also sets the stage for feelings of 
discrimination and marginalization by all communities, although notably these feelings are often 
based on inaccurate information and data. On the other hand, the complex South Serbia environment 
requires strong and mature political leadership among Serbs, Albanians and Roma, which is not 
always present. On the Albanian and Roma side, this is in part due to the history of non-participation 
in political processes and the influence of ‘big-politics’ emanating from Belgrade and Pristina.  With 
aging political elites, it is crucial that the new generation of political leaders are prepared for the 
challenges to be faced in the future, although there is little evidence to suggest that these new political 
elites are being given the necessary space in official structures. 
 
Programme results and their conflict mitigation contribution. Initiatives preceding the 
current programme and their results have been described above. They have played a key role in 
eliminating some of the key conditions conducive to conflict such as the employment of former 
fighters and the long-term unemployed and the stimulation of the local economy as well as supporting 
the creation of a legitimate political authority through support to civil society and local governance. 
The on-going Municipal Improvement and Revival Programme phase II (MIR II)79 is the second phase 
of a programme which began in 2003, with a geographical focus on South Serbia. MIR II builds on the 
achievements of the first phase in terms of confidence building, poverty reduction, municipal 
infrastructure development and change in the behaviour of municipal officials. The overall objective is 
to strengthen local good governance in South Serbia in terms of the delivery of services to citizens and 
local and inter-municipal stewardship of social and economic development. The programme should 
support South Serbia municipalities to, individually and jointly, plan and take strategic action to 
achieve the sustainable economic and social development of the region and to fulfil their obligations to 
citizens. MIR II activities are organised under four main components: i) inter-municipal co-operation 
for development, ii) municipality strategic planning for development, iii) improved municipal 
management and administration, and iv) improved delivery of municipal administrative services. In 
                                               
79 For a detailed description see UNDP (2005) Municipal Improvement and Revival Programme Phase II, Project Document, 
UNDP Serbia, Belgrade.   
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addition, promotion of gender equality and environmental protection are two issues cross-cutting 
these four components.  
 
The assessment of responses from a conflict mitigation perspective is focused predominantly on the 
MIR II programme, with the contribution of previous interventions briefly evaluated in the concluding 
part. It draws on the situation analysis and identifies concrete contributions to mitigation of identified 
conflict factors made by the programme components (regional cooperation, strategic 
planning/investment and municipal capacity-building, which includes improving universal 
management and communication skills, agricultural support and delivery of municipal administrative 
services),80 as well as by ways of working (the latter is summarised in a joint section for both case 
studies included after the Southwest Serbia section). For further operationalisation, the key conflict 
factors described in the situation analyses have been grouped into three categories – i) political 
representation and participation in governance, including governance and institutional aspects, ii) 
economic and iii) social.  The conflict mitigation contribution of the MIR II programme components 
are summarized in table 2 and described in detail in the following paragraphs. 
 
Table 2: The conflict mitigation contribution of MIR II programme components. 
 
  
Municipal capacity-building 
 
 
Strategic planning and 
investment 
 
 
Regional cooperation 
Political representation 
and participation 
All training activities using non-
discriminatory approach involving 
mixed groups 
Increased local administration 
capacity, greater response and 
transparency through Citizen 
Assistance Centres established in 
12 municipalities  
 
11 Development Strategies 
prepared through participatory 
process and approved by 
municipal assemblies 
Investment project selected 
through representative 
committees 
 
 
Transparently functioning and 
non-discriminatory Steering 
Committee 
Improved cooperation with 
Coordination Body 
Regional Development Agency 
RDA) supporting all municipalities 
Improved access to high-level 
national and international officials 
Trust-building through mixed 
study tours 
 
Economic inequalities Increased awareness and capacity 
to create conditions for economic 
development including training on 
financial and project management, 
Establishment of 24 Agro-corners  
 
 
   
Development strategies 
emphasizing economic 
development 
Investment projects supporting 
economic development  
10 sub-projects supporting 
management of agricultural 
sector  
 
Allocation of resources for 
municipalities reflecting post-
conflict situation and inequalities  
Mixed contractors and programme 
staff  
Regional projects supporting 
infrastructure building, 
development of a tourism plan and 
identification of  investment 
barriers  
 
Access to services 
 
Improved access of all citizens to 
services though Citizen Assistance 
Centres  
 
Majority of investment projects 
targeting social infrastructure 
(education, health, water supply, 
sewage, waste management) and 
addressing inequalities 
 
 
Regional projects related to waste 
management feasibility studies, 
water supply for Presevo and 
Bujanovac and a sewage network 
around Vlasina Lake      
RDA supporting access to EU and 
other funding  
 
 
Contribution to political representation and participation. Regional MIR II governance structures 
have been inclusive and have demonstrated both to the Albanian and Serbian leaders the benefits of 
minority participation in political and policy processes and concrete activities.  The Albanian mayors 
who have actively participated in the Steering Committee increasingly understand the necessity of 
Albanian municipalities to develop within the broader framework of South Serbia. The chairing of the 
MIR II Steering Committee by the Coordination Body has had two indirect benefits related to political 
participation. It has contributed to increased transparency and accountability of the Coordination 
                                               
80 For a better understanding of the relation between financial allocation and contribution to conflict prevention, the 
programme budget allocations for specific components were as follows: regional cooperation – 1,12 million USD, strategic 
planning and municipal investment projects - 5, 08 million USD, improved municipal management (including improving 
universal management and communication skills and agricultural support)  - 1,43 million USD, improving delivery of municipal 
administrative services) - 0,45 million USD.     
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Body and simultaneously it has broadened the involvement of Albanian leaders in the work of this 
institution. The use of transparent and responsive mechanisms for resource allocation and project 
selection at regional and municipal levels has set an example of how participatory and non-
discriminatory planning and decision-making works in practice. This also led to greater efficiency in 
addressing the needs of communities in various municipalities. MIR II has facilitated access by local 
Albanian and Serbian leaders to high level governmental and international officials, both through 
their participation in the Steering Committee meetings as well as frequent meetings and visits in the 
region and Belgrade related to concrete programme activities. This has enabled the presentation of 
local needs, potentially increasing a sense of integration. 
 
At the municipal level, the development strategies were developed in 11 municipalities (except 
Trgoviste) through an open, participatory and inclusive planning process creating space for the non-
discriminatory participation of all ethnic groups, civil society and the private sector. Between January 
2006 and February 2008, all these strategies were formally approved by the Municipal Assemblies 
and represent a consensus of all political parties on the future municipal development and investment 
priorities (in Leskovac and Presevo the revisions of already existing strategies were approved, all 
strategies also include a detailed action plan). The establishment of Citizen Assistance Centres (CAC) 
in the municipalities ensured improved and non-discriminatory access to services by all communities 
and citizens. These Centres, which will be by the end of the programme established in all 
municipalities, represent a ‘one-stop-shop’ for the interaction between local administration and its 
customers, be it the general public, private or non-governmental sector. It allows for streamlined, 
transparent and non-discriminatory provision of services related to notary and registry and also more 
sophisticated processes and permits. Currently, the crucial and complex process of building permits is 
being analyzed and proposed for inclusion in CAC operation. All these new developments contribute 
to a greater efficiency and transparency in the work of the municipalities and provide an opportunity 
for multi-ethnic interaction. Selected municipalities are also being supported in urban planning 
processes and related digitalisation of spatial plans. 
 
Additionally, the capacity-building activities, including training needs assessment and targeted 
trainings and study tours, bringing together officials from several municipalities across ethnic lines, 
have contributed to individual and institutional capacity development, professional networking and 
trust-building. Interviewees have pointed out that the relationships formed have been sustained. The 
extensive training in general management, project cycle and financial management leads to greater 
effectiveness, efficiency and transparency of public management, generally improving governance at 
the municipal level. The support of financial management is timely, concentrating on the novelties 
introduced by the new taxation and financing of local self-government legislation requiring the 
establishment of local tax administration offices. The general management training is followed by the 
establishment of functioning planning and reporting systems in one department initially in at least 
five municipalities, including the municipalities of Presevo and Bujanovac. Extensive training on 
communication and preparation of internal and external communication strategies (12 of them should 
be finalised and approved by March 2008), should further contribute to more transparent and open 
interaction between politicians, municipal administration and the general public, which is crucial 
especially in a multi-ethnic and post-conflict environment. Participation and inclusiveness as well as 
objective media coverage of the region is further supported through other, perhaps more limited but 
very effective activities, such as trainings of journalists and artwork contests. For example the recent 
competition for contributions to a 2008 calendar resulted in the submission of 1653 individual art 
works from 50 schools in all the municipalities of the region.  
 
Addressing economic inequalities and development. The previous programmes have directly targeted 
the employment of former fighters and the long-term unemployed. This has been complemented and 
systematized by the current programme through stimulating the local economy and directly 
supporting the private sector through the development of farmers groups and cooperatives. In 
addition, among the criteria reflected by the Steering Committee in the allocation of resources were 
the economic situation, post-conflict needs and inequalities.  This has resulted in the allocation of 
greater resources, in particular to deprived municipalities and has by extension contributed to 
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reducing some of the economic inequalities. In the implementation of economic development related 
activities, MIR II has placed emphasis on ensuring transparency and equal opportunity. This has 
meant that a mixed group of Albanian and Serbian contractors has been used for the project 
implementation in various localities. The introduction of clear procedures has also led to greater 
accountability and therefore improved delivery in implementation. Similar principles have been used 
in the programme staff selection. The establishment of a Regional Development Centre (RDC), 
launched in November 2006, is critical for systematically supporting the economic development of the 
region. It will equally support all municipalities in the South Serbia region and promote a regional 
approach, which will also benefit Albanian-dominated municipalities. The Albanian municipalities 
have actively participated in the creation of the Centre and are active in its Assembly, which is the 
main governing body. Work done and studies related to the development of a tourism plan, reducing 
investment barriers and infrastructure such as waste management feasibility studies, water supply for 
Presevo and Bujanovac and a sewage network around Vlasina Lake, which will directly increase its 
tourism potential, are likely to have direct and more equitable impacts on economic development 
across the municipalities. In total, two regional projects have been already tendered, and five 
submitted for possible funding to the National Investment Plan. The RDA further supported 6 
municipalities in the preparation of projects financed from the EcoFund. 
 
At the municipal level, all strategic plans emphasise the importance of economic development. They 
include strategic analysis and recommendations, often with concrete measures and investments that 
are important in stimulating economic development. The investment projects have contributed 
indirectly, through infrastructure and transport projects and directly, for example by building the 
market places, to local economic development. This was complemented by programme components 
aimed at improving management of the agricultural sector and regional guarantee fund. In particular 
the establishment of 24 agro-corners (5 of which in Presevo Valley) and the implementation of 10 sub-
projects have supported agricultural and rural development as crucial sectors for future economic 
development. In addition, 41 mixed municipal staff have attended agricultural training. Training in 
general management, project cycle management, financial management and communication has 
increased awareness and capacity to create positive conditions for economic development at the 
municipal level.    
 
Impacts on access to services. The improvement of access to services through infrastructure projects 
has been the most visible part of the MIR II programme and represents by far the largest budgetary 
item.81 It has been implemented with sensitivity to community needs, as well as with careful 
consideration of inter-community relations.  By February 2008, 39 projects have been awarded, with 
21 already completed and 14 contracted. The majority of investments into social infrastructure, in 
particular in education, health, drinking waste, sewage and waste management, have directly 
addressed social inequality issues as mentioned previously in the context analysis. These projects also 
directly and indirectly contributed to employment generation. At a regional level, the Regional 
Development Centre leads work on feasibility studies related to water and waste management and the 
water supply for Presevo and Bujanovac. This, as well as further assistance by the RDC to 
municipalities in accessing European Union and other funding for investment into social 
infrastructure will further contribute to a reduction of horizontal inequalities and improvement in the 
social situation. 
 
 
CASE STUDY OF SOUTHWEST SERBIA (SANDZAK) 
 
Context analysis. Southwest Serbia is a multi-ethnic region covering 6 municipalities, namely Novi 
Pazar, Sjenica, Tutin, Nova Varos, Prijepolje and Priboj.  The region borders Bosnia and Herzegovina 
                                               
81 In Presevo, MIR I supported 10 projects (465 000 Euro) and MIR II one project (34,6 million Dinars), the projects mainly 
dealt with education, water supply and waste water management as well as waste management. In Bujanovac, MIR I supported 
12 projects (346 400 Euro) and MIR II one project (32,8 million Dinars), the projects mainly dealt with education, water supply 
and waste water management, heating and electricity supply. In Medvedja, MIR I supported 6 projects (93 500 Euro) and MIR 
II one project (6,8 million Dinars), the projects mainly dealt with water supply and water management, heating, electricity 
supply and lightning and health.  
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(BiH), Montenegro and Kosovo.  It is often called ‘Sandzak’, the term originating from Ottoman times 
and evoking historical and political connotations, which previously included 11 municipalities, five of 
them being now in Montenegro (Bijelo Polje, Rozaje, Plave, Plevlje, Berane). The municipalities in 
Southwest Serbia are populated by the single largest Muslim-Slav community (Bosniak) in the 
Western Balkans outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina.82 The Twentieth Century has witnessed large 
population movements in the region as a result of several wars, political upheaval, changing borders 
and administrative arrangements. During the Milosevic era, nationalist rhetoric, politics and 
discriminatory policies alienated most Bosniaks from state institutions. During the war in BiH, there 
were numerous documented human rights abuses, kidnappings and murders of Bosniaks.83 This 
period also saw a push for Sandzak autonomy led by Sulejman Ugljanin, the current Mayor of Novi 
Pazar. Despite all the turbulence the region remained relatively stable. 
 
Despite the level of underdevelopment and its turbulent past, in comparison to other regions in 
Serbia, Southwest Serbia has been largely neglected by the international community. The limited 
activities of the international community implemented in the region have been related to the closure 
of collective centres, social investment and civil society, community revitalisation, local governance 
reform, private sector focusing predominantly on agriculture and SME development and 
environmental protection. Actors involved included the European Agency for Reconstruction, USAID, 
the Danish Refugee Council, the Governments of Austria, Italy, Luxemburg and Switzerland as well as 
several UN agencies. Interventions of several donors, especially in Novi Pazar, failed to be 
implemented successfully and the region has been broadly considered by the international community 
as difficult to work in.  
 
Conflict and Peace Dynamics. From a conflict perspective, among the six municipalities in Southwest 
Serbia the risk of violent conflict is primarily limited to the municipalities of Novi Pazar, Sjenica, and 
Tutin.  This risk is currently expressed in confrontations between two Bosniak political parties and 
splits in the Islamic Community, the actors of which potentially represent ‘spoilers’ of peace. The 
other municipalities, Priboj, Nova Varos and Prijepolje, remain relatively unaffected, although the 
situation in BiH and Kosovo may have a destabilizing effect. There are several reasons for this 
differentiation with different ethnic compositions and the traditional harmonious ethnic relations 
being the most influential. In Nova Varos and Priboj, for example, Bosniaks are in a minority, while in 
Prijepolje the ethnic composition is balanced between Bosniaks and Serbs.84 The focus of the conflict 
assessment is therefore on Novi Pazar, Sjenica, and Tutin.  Among these municipalities, the 
expression of conflict is most visible in Novi Pazar, with Tutin gravitating towards and directly 
reflecting the situation in adjacent Novi Pazar. Dynamics in Sjenica are affected by the specificity of 
municipal power struggles between the Party for Democratic Action (SDA) and the Sandzak 
Democratic Party (SDP). Identified conflict and peace indicators are divided into visible (surface) and 
those that are more systemic (underlying) as outlined in the scheme in annex II.   
 
Conflict Indicators. Political clashes between SDA and SDP supporters, the emergence of Wahhabism, 
along with the recent split in the Islamic Community are covered extensively in the Serbian media. 
Political confrontations are rooted in the personal conflict between Sulejman Ugljanin, as previously 
mentioned the current Mayor of Novi Pazar and the SDA leader, and Rasim Ljajic, the current Serbian 
Minister of Labour, Employment and Social Policy and leader of the SDP. Beyond personal 
antagonisms and ambitions, there seems to be, at least perceived, differing visions of the region and 
its future. One could be characterised as inwards looking, based on identity-politics and strict control 
and the other as more open and pro-European. Until recently, there has been unity within the Islamic 
                                               
82 According to the 2002 census, the region has 235,567 inhabitants out of which 142,350 (60%) declared themselves Bosniaks.  
38% of inhabitants are Serbs or Montenegrins, and the remaining 2% are dispersed among other ethnic groups.  In the western 
municipalities, Bosniaks are in a minority (7% in Nova Varos, 23% in Priboj, and 41% in Prijepolje), while in the east they form 
the majority (78% in Novi Pazar, 95% in Tutin, and 75% in Sjenica). 
83 The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Sandzak registered by the end of 1996, 1082 cases in which the police searched 
homes looking for guns, 446 persons taken into custody, and 422 cases of physical mistreatment.  For details on abductions and 
killings of Bosniaks by paramilitary and security forces during the Bosnian war see, for example, ICG (2005), Serbia’s Sandzak: 
Still Forgotten. Europe Report No. 162, 8 April 2005, 50 p. 
84 Prijepolje is often referred to as the only example of a functioning and harmonious multi-ethnic municipality in Serbia. 
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Community. However, there is now a rift in the Islamic Community, with some following Mufti 
Muamer Zukorlic (Mufti of Sandzak) and others, which seem to be the minority, the newly elected 
Reis Adem Zilkic (Islamic Community of Serbia), who is also supported by the Belgrade Imam 
Muhamed Jusufspahic. This situation resulted at the end of 2007 and early 2008 in incidents of 
small-scale violence. Many respondents believe that the rift in the Islamic Community reflects the 
political divisions between the SDA and SDP and is partly driven by the local political leaders with the 
possible involvement of the central Government. However, there is widespread feeling that unity 
remains among ordinary members of the Islamic Community and that the rift is not related to the 
interpretations of religion.  
 
The March 2007 Serbian police operation against a suspected Islamic extremist mountain training 
camp near Novi Pazar reportedly yielded weapons, plastic explosives and ammunition. It has triggered 
concerns of the emergence of a Wahhabist threat in the region. The Wahhabis arrested have since 
been charged with allegedly plotting to kill Muamer Zukorlic and planning attacks on a police station 
in Novi Pazar, as well as on targets in Belgrade.85 Most interviewees however dismiss the Wahhabist 
threat as over-rated, calling the young men involved as ‘confused’ and not numbering more than 
between 100-300 individuals.  Muslim religious leaders have also repeatedly stressed that Wahhabism 
is not part of mainstream Islam as practiced in the region.  Nonetheless, even though Wahhabis may 
not constitute a real threat, there is still potential that their presence could be instrumentalised for 
other negative political and religious purposes. Political fights between Bosniak parties and the rift 
within the Islamic community occur in a context of extensively manipulated local and sensationalist 
national media. With few exceptions, local newspapers, radio and television are polarized along 
political lines. The journalistic standards are also very low thus compounding bias and inflammatory 
reporting. Many respondents also highlighted that there is extensive political interference into the 
work of the municipal courts. Municipal courts are said to have low capacity, which has been 
acknowledged by the Ministry of Justice.  Local confidence in the municipal judicial structures is 
almost non-existent, with widespread allegations of corruption, partiality, and collusion with criminal 
elements. 
 
Below the surface, several political, governance, economic, and social conflict characteristics can be 
identified. Overall weak governance has both national and local dimensions. Historic neglect of the 
region by central government is coupled with inefficient and remote public administration structures. 
Public administration and service provision is often organized so that higher level offices or 
authorities are not concentrated in one city, but spread across cities in and outside of the region. At 
the local level, municipal structures have limited public management capacity and poor human 
resources, and are sometimes affected by corruption and the mismanagement of funds. The 
distinction between municipal structures and political leadership is often blurred. In some cases, 
municipalities become dysfunctional due to political divisions between the Mayor and the Assembly, 
for example in Sjenica. There is some evidence to suggest that there is under-representation of 
Bosniaks in the state structures.  For example, 57.4% of the police force in Tutin, which is a 
municipality with a 95% Bosniak population, is Serbian.  A similar picture can be seen in the judiciary, 
public utilities, and other state institutions such as tax inspection and schools.86 
 
In the economic sphere, historic under-investment has deeply affected the region’s socioeconomic 
standing compared to other parts of Serbia. Combined with limited municipal spending on basic social 
services, it also has impacted on the quality of education and economic development, with consequent 
high levels of unemployment. Southwest Serbia suffers from less central government investment than 
other parts of Serbia, for instance the realised investment per capita (without private ownership) in 
2005 varied between 137 Dinars in Prijepolje and 1915 Dinars in Nova Varos, radically below the 
national average of 21,980 Dinars. The claim presented in several interviews that Bosniak dominated 
municipalities receive less than Serb dominated ones, has not been confirmed by statistical data. The 
inter-municipal and regional inequalities can be further illustrated by the low levels of GDP per 
                                               
85 Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, 28 November 2007. For more detail see http://www.birn.eu.com/en/114/15/6601/. 
86 International Crisis Group (2005). 
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capita.87 As mentioned previously, Tutin is officially categorised by the Government as an extremely 
underdeveloped municipality and Sjenica and Prijepolje as underdeveloped municipalities. The state 
of education is illustrated by literacy levels.  The illiteracy rate in the region is 9.8% compared to 7.1% 
Serbia-wide, with highest figures in Sjenica (12.1%) and Tutin (11.6%).88 Whereas these figures can 
partly be explained by historic under-investment in the region, they are also caused by the under-
investment of municipalities in education. Such under-investment becomes acute in places such as 
Novi Pazar, where due to immigration and demographic dynamics 22% of the total population are 
students in public schools. Novi Pazar municipal officials state that they need an additional five 
primary schools, two secondary schools and one additional higher education institution. Many schools 
in the municipality, therefore, have to organise three shifts.89 At pre-school level only 12% of the total 
demand is covered, suggesting that five more kindergartens are needed. However, opposition parties 
in Novi Pazar state that municipal budgetary allocations in 2006 were approximately 6% for 
education, slightly more than the 4% allocated by the municipality for regional television. 
Employment was high in municipalities such as Novi Pazar in the 1990’s, however stricter commercial 
laws, tax and custom regimes and competition from China led to a subsequent depression in the 
economy and sharply increased levels of unemployment.90 Currently, unemployment in Southwest 
Serbia is very high, especially among the youth.91 Many interviewees have mentioned the significant 
size of the informal economy as well as illicit economic activities that revolve around drugs, weapons, 
tobacco, alcohol, and human trafficking, with a strong cross-border dimension with Kosovo and BiH. 
It is difficult to estimate the full scope and impact of these activities on the local economy and conflict 
dynamics. However, the significant number of drug addicts in itself is indicative of the size of ‘the 
industry’.92   
 
In the social sector, two factors are noticeable. Political upheaval, war, and limited economic 
opportunities have led to significant out-migration. According to the 2002 census, the region lost 
8.64% of its population as compared to 1991.93 Only Novi Pazar has recorded an increase in its 
population, largely at the expense of the surrounding villages and other municipalities. The economic 
boom in Novi Pazar in the 1990s served as a magnet for rural populations. For example, Priboj lost 
approximately 50% of its Bosniak population to migration, while Sjenica experienced a 30-40% loss.  
Out-migration has been particularly present among young and skilled people, some of whom went as 
far as Sarajevo, Belgrade, and Western countries, including the USA and Canada.94  This ‘brain-drain’ 
has significant implications for future regional economic and political development. Civil society in 
the region remains relatively weak.  Although NGOs are few in number and small in size, they are 
vocal and some have been active for more than a decade.  NGOs have played an important role in 
promoting citizen participation, accountability in local government and monitoring and advocating 
for human rights.95 A concern, however, is the polarization between some civil society groups and 
political leadership of municipalities, with limited dialogue and frequent antagonistic exchanges. 
Some civil society groups are becoming politically aligned, which may, in the eyes of the public, 
undermine their role as credible advocates for a progressive agenda. The most salient conflict factors 
relate to weak governance, coupled with manipulated media and excluded civil society, weak judiciary, 
limited economic activities, high unemployment and illicit economic activities. Many of these, 
                                               
87 This underinvestment contributes to very low per capita GDP. Per capita GDP in Novi Pazar is 53,640 Dinars, Sjenica 47,682, 
Tutin 35,601, Nova Varos 89,270, Prijepolje 55,704 and Priboj 56,111 as compared to the Serbian average of 144,109 Dinars. 
Figures, including those on investment are taken from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (2006) Municipalities in 
Serbia 2006, Development indicators, Belgrade.   
88 International Crisis Group (2005). However, neighbouring Serb-dominated Raska has an illiteracy level of 11,8%, which 
suggests that there are no ethnically based differences. 
89 Interview with Bosniak political leader and municipality official in Novi Pazar. 
90 The textile and shoe industry in Novi Pazar employed several thousand people until the end of the 1990’s.   
91 Unemployment in Novi Pazar is 41.4%, Sjenica 55.8%, Tutin 61.1%, Nova Varos 40.9%, Prijepolje 47.8%, Priboj 50.6%. 
Unemployment figures are given for 2005 and use the formula of unemployed divided by the labour force. Figures taken from 
the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. 
92 Some interviewees estimate the number of drug addicts in Novi Pazar alone between 7000 and 10000. 
93 Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, figures taken from a comparison of the 1991 and 2002 censuses. 
94 Interviews with political leaders and NGOs. 
95 Interviews with NGO leaders in Novi Pazar. 
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however, can be addressed in part or in full through broadly conceptualised and well-targeted 
development related interventions.   
 
Peace Indicators. The relative stability of Southwest Serbia over the years shows that there are 
important drivers of peace in the region.  Inter-ethnic relations in the region between Bosniaks and 
Serbs are overall relatively unproblematic. Whereas there have been cases of inter-personal violence 
along ethnic lines and related to abuses perpetrated during the Bosnian war and the memories of the 
suffering are still present, most interviewees stated that common language and historical coexistence 
are important contributors to harmonious relations. Increasing trade and productive economic 
activities are visible in places such as Novi Pazar and Prijepolje. Key drivers of wealth creation are a 
pervasive entrepreneurial spirit, extensive remittances from Diaspora and the region’s advantageous 
geographical position resulting in increased cross-border trade. Together, these factors represent the 
region’s economic potential. Although migration has had negative impacts as described in the 
previous paragraph, it also paradoxically contributes to some stability, as the region’s population 
seems not to be ‘trapped’ and is ready to seek opportunities elsewhere if these are not present locally. 
Although, the current levels of international engagement remain limited, another factor that has 
potential to contribute to stability is increasing international attention to the region.   
 
Programme results and their conflict mitigation contribution. Municipal Development in 
the South West Serbia Programme (PRO I) was designed to build on the results of the previous UNDP 
interventions in Prijepolje, Nova Varos, Priboj and Sjenica. These activities concentrated 
predominantly on municipal capacity building and strategic planning with limited resources for 
investment. The first phase of the programme was initiated in mid 2006 with implementation 
envisaged until 2008 and is supported by the European Agency for Reconstruction and Swiss 
Development Cooperation, with UNDP serving as implementing partner.96 The overall objective of the 
programme is to strengthen local government in facilitating socio-economic development by 
effectively using EU and other funding support. The specific purpose is to develop capacities of local 
stakeholders and local governments, so municipalities in South West Serbia, individually and jointly, 
plan and take strategic action to achieve the sustainable socio-economic development of the region. 
This should be achieved through: i) improvement of municipal capacity to plan and implement 
selected priority projects based on sustainable development plans and EU funding requirements; and 
ii) creation of inter-municipal and area-based development partnerships for sustainable socio-
economic growth and to better exploit future EU funding support in Southwest Serbia.97 The recently 
initiated ‘Municipal Development in South West Serbia Programme - second phase’ (PRO II) will 
build on the results achieved during the first phase and will extend the programme until the end of 
2009. It will continue working in six municipalities, adding the two municipalities of Raska and 
Ivanjica, and will provide essential support to inter-municipal activities through the establishment of 
Regional Development Agencies and the preparation of a Regional Development Plan.98   
 
The assessment of responses from a conflict mitigation perspective is focused primarily on PRO I. As 
with South Serbia, it draws on the situation analysis and identifies concrete contributions to conflict 
mitigation made by the programme components as well as through ways of working.  It also highlights 
                                               
96 For a better understanding of the relation between financial allocation and contribution to conflict prevention, the budget and 
programme budget allocations for specific components were as follows: budget of PRO I is close to 3,2 million Euro (2,2 million 
of EAR contribution and 1 million of Swiss contribution). Budget allocation for the investment projects is 1,7 million Euro, for  
the human resources 670 000 Euro and for CACs 300 000 Euro. Budget of PRO II is 6,4 million Euro (4,9 million of EAR 
contribution and 1,5 million of Swiss contribution). Budget allocation for the investment projects is 3,26 million Euro, for the 
human resources 1,33 million Euro, for support to RDAs and regional activities 400 000 Euro, for the training and study tours 
233 000 Euro and the civic participation 100 000 Euro, the same amount is allocated for CACs. In both cases the municipal 
contribution should be at least 10%.   
97 For more information see the project documents UNDP (2006) ‘Municipal Development in South West Serbia’, UNDP 
Serbia, Belgrade and UNDP (2007) ‘Municipal Development in South West Serbia - Second Phase’, UNDP Serbia, Belgrade. 
98 It is expected that this will be accomplished through the following results: a) organizational effectiveness and efficiency 
improved and capacities to fulfil assigned functions to deliver services to citizens in municipalities in South West Serbia 
increased; b) capacities and capabilities for the implementation of municipal sustainable development strategies strengthened 
and a system for monitoring of progress established; c) infrastructure projects based on identified socio-economic priorities for 
municipalities in South West Serbia selected and implemented and d) support inter-municipal cooperation and facilitate 
establishment of sustainable regional development partnerships. 
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challenges faced and opportunities missed by the programme in this respect. The conflict mitigation 
contribution of the programme is summarized in table 3 and described in detail in the following 
paragraphs. The table reflects the contribution of the activities and results in addressing identified 
underlying and visible conflict factors at both municipal (including the capacity building, strategic 
planning and investment components) and regional levels (regional cooperation component). For 
further operationalisation, the factors described in the situation analysis have been grouped into three 
categories – governance, including political and institutional aspects, economic and social.  
 
Table 3: The conflict mitigation contribution of PRO programme components. 
 
   
Municipal level including capacity building, 
strategic planning and investment 
 
Regional cooperation 
 
 
Governance and 
political 
representation 
 
6 Sustainable Development Strategies prepared through 
participatory processes and approved by Assemblies 
Preparation of Action Plans initiated 
Strategic planning processes incorporating ethnic 
dimension, civil society and private sector 
Investment project selected through representative 
committees 
Capacity needs assessment and functional reviews of 
municipalities followed by training of municipal staff 
with special focus on improved budget planning and 
financial management 
 
 
Transparently functioning and non-discriminatory 
Steering Committee  
Increased cooperation with central Government 
Increased mutual understanding and cooperation 
among municipalities through the process of 
establishment of RDAs, regional development 
planning and regional projects preparation  
 
 
Economic 
development 
Economic priorities identified in development 
strategies and action plans  
Municipal oversight and management capacity 
increased through Municipal Implementation Units and 
Municipal Development Committees 
Investment in physical infrastructure enabling 
economic development   
Preparation of regional development plan (with 
emphasis on economic development) 
Regional projects creating conditions for economic 
development 
 
Social services  
 
Investment projects improving social service delivery 
and social infrastructure 
Greater responsiveness and transparency through 
establishment of 6 Citizens Assistance Centres  
Municipal social priorities identified in development 
strategies and plans 
Civil society capacity building through Citizens 
Involvement Fund and provision of micro-grants  
 
 
Regional projects concentrating on social 
infrastructure (water, sewage, waste, gasification) 
Exchange of experience between municipalities 
related to service delivery   
 
 
 
 
Contribution to governance and political representation. Addressing the key issues of governance 
and participation identified in the situation analysis at the regional level regular meetings of the 
Steering Committee contributed to improved mutual understanding and cooperation between 
municipalities themselves and with central Government.  This helped to partly redress some of the 
municipal and regional governance deficits.  The use of transparent and responsive mechanisms for 
resource allocation and project selection at regional and municipal levels has set an example of 
participatory and non-discriminatory planning and decision-making, which is particularly important 
in a conflict context. PRO I has facilitated the access of all local leaders to high level government and 
international officials through participation in the Steering Committee and meetings and visits related 
to programme activities. The creation of working groups as part of the process leading to the 
preparation of a Regional Development Plan, as well as the establishment of Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs) will help consolidate these governance gains. However, in this respect, it will be of 
utmost importance to ensure that the RDAs are not politically instrumentalised. The study tour for 
representatives of all municipalities to Slovenia resulted not only in practical learning and the 
exchange of experiences but also in the critical opening of the region and motivation from positive 
examples of EU member states with a shared history and similar context.  
 
At the municipal level, all 6 sustainable development strategies have been developed through 
participatory and non-discriminatory processes including the establishment of representative local 
action groups, public hearings, use of international expertise and a study tour to Slovenia.  The 
approval of the strategies by the Municipal Assemblies between December 2006 and December 2007 
(Prijepolje has already approved the action plan) represents a commitment of all political parties, 
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across potential dividing lines, on the future developmental priorities of the municipalities. These 
priorities are being further operationalised in the action plans currently under preparation. 
Additionally, the strategies in Nova Varos and Prijepolje have been revised in light of new baseline 
studies. The monitoring mechanisms of strategy implementation are being developed. All these should 
lead to the institutionalization of participatory and non-discriminatory planning processes at the local 
level. The extensive SWOT analyses and socio-economic and baseline studies of all municipalities and 
districts supported by the programme contribute not only to greater understanding of issues in the 
region, but also provide objective baseline data important for eliminating or at least mitigating 
perceived but often unsubstantiated inequalities. 
 
Through capacity needs assessments and functional reviews of the municipalities completed in 2007 
in all municipalities (including more than 170 questionnaires filled in by municipal staff), the 
directions for capacity-building have been identified and are being addressed through extensive 
capacity building training. This includes classroom and on-the-job learning, coaching and 
management consulting to stimulate necessary organizational changes. This component should lead 
to the improvement of municipal management in finance, project management, human resources, 
urban and infrastructure planning and management and external communication and relations with 
citizens. Special attention is given to municipal budgeting leading to a review of current practices, 
preparation of sound financial planning and reporting systems with a clearly defined, transparent and 
accountable monitoring system for budget execution. This should also lead to linking municipal 
budgetary planning processes and international donors funding for development priorities. A 
conference in 2008 on the modernization of municipal services organized by PRO in cooperation with 
the Standing Conference of Towns and Municipalities will further promote administrative reforms at 
the municipal level. Transparency and accountability at the municipal level has been promoted by 
PRO through the creation of Municipal Implementation Units and Development Committees that are 
inclusive and broad-based in their composition. These committees participated in the selection of 
investment projects.  In the future, avoiding the creation of parallel structures, the committees will be 
transformed into Committees for the Development and Protection of Local Self-Government required 
by the Law on Local Self Government.99 They have the potential, if used appropriately, to further 
foster accountability and transparency. Improvement in relation to public management capacity, 
transparency and accountability is especially important in multi-ethnic and conflict regions as it 
directly addresses some of the conflict factors identified in the situation analysis.    
Economic impacts. Municipal development strategies have placed special emphasis on economic 
development and provide a useful framework for work on key economic issues. Municipal 
Implementation Units in all municipalities have played an increasingly active role in the 
implementation and monitoring of investment projects. Investment projects represent concrete inputs 
to economic development including employment generation. By the end of 2007, 26 out of 34 
contracts, related to 24 sub-projects were completed.100 These projects, which mainly concentrated on 
physical infrastructure and social services, have contributed to the creation of an enabling 
environment for economic development.  However, future investment projects should more directly 
support economic activities. The formulation of a Regional Development Plan and establishment of 
the RDAs should further contribute to the systemic creation of an enabling economic environment. It 
is important to ensure that the RDAs pay particular attention to economic issues, especially 
productive activities and investment that stimulates job creation. RDAs will also assist in the 
preparation and implementation of economic development projects at the regional level. So far, a 
feasibility study for the establishment of Regional Development Agencies has been prepared and 
complemented by activities towards increasing awareness and understanding within the region of 
                                               
99 According to the Serbian Law on Local Self Government, Article 127, ‘the Assembly of the local self government unit may 
establish the Committee for Development and Protection of Local Self Government for the purpose of providing a democratic 
influence of citizens on the improvement of local self government.  The members of the Committee shall be selected amongst 
citizens and experts in the fields relevant to the local self government’. 
100 The investment projects include mainly construction work related to transport infrastructure including bridges (5 projects), 
municipal infrastructure (7), heating (4), water supply and waste management (3) and reconstruction and improvement in 
hospitals (1), kindergartens (4), schools (6), cultural centre, museum and library (3), sport facilities (1) of the total value 
exceeding 1.9 million Euro with approximately 351 ,000Euro provided by municipalities as direct cost-sharing.    
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inter-municipal cooperation, regional development and the role of RDAs in these processes. A series 
of conferences, targeting the public and private sector as well as civil society, have been held covering 
10 municipalities in the Zlatiborski District and 9 municipalities in the Raski and Moravicki Districts 
facilitating consensus on the establishment and location of the RDAs, preparation of the regional 
development plans and development and implementation of regional projects. The regional 
development plan should again be prepared through a participatory process including all relevant 
stakeholders. Envisaged regional projects under PRO that include infrastructure (for example road 
construction and installing gas) and service delivery (for example waste and waste water 
management) and the potential formation of industrial zones and preparation of a regional tourism 
strategy will also create more favourable conditions for economic development and provide a 
framework for increased inter-municipal cooperation, including planning and joint financing. All 
these activities contribute to addressing important conflict factors related to economic development as 
identified in the situation analysis and to the inclusion of Southwest Serbia into a broad, economically 
more viable regional context.   
Social impacts. The preparation of development strategies led to the identification of key social issues 
at the municipal level. Whereas inclusiveness and participation has been challenging at times, 
particularly with strained civil society and municipal relations in some areas, it has contributed to an 
increased level of accountability in local government. As mentioned above, a range of education, 
health, and cultural investment projects have been implemented addressing some of the social issues 
identified in the situation analysis and municipal development strategies. The establishment of Citizen 
Assistance Centres (CACs) in all municipalities have facilitated the re-organisation of administrative 
processes and internal organizational structures, capacity building for staff and both short and long-
term interventions to improve services to citizens. This will make municipalities more capable 
responding to municipal issues in the areas they are responsible for and will lead to improved and 
non-discriminatory access to services for all communities and citizens. These gains will be further 
consolidated through envisaged reviews of lessons learned, staff training, and exchanges of experience 
between municipalities in this area later in 2008. The customer satisfaction survey is also envisaged to 
assess the progress in improvement of public management in municipalities. The creation of a Civil 
Involvement Fund is promising as it should support civil society through the implementation of small 
projects and encourage work with citizens and other partners including municipal authorities. The 
first round announcement resulted in 81 eligible project proposals submitted by 75 NGOs/citizens 
organizations with 19 finally granted.      
 
Contribution through ‘ways of working’ in South and Southwest Serbia. As mentioned in 
chapter 2, the ABD approach differentiates between what needs to be done and how it should be 
done, placing particular importance on the second aspect. Therefore in addition to concrete 
programme component impacts described in previous paragraphs, there are also several specific ‘ways 
of working’ within MIR and PRO that have contributed to conflict mitigation. Due to the similarities in 
the programme approaches but also in the conflict mitigation contribution of ’ways of working’, this 
chapter summarizes these for both regions. What could be called ‘walking the talk’, the norm setting 
and demonstration effect of both programmes have been significant. The programmes have advocated 
for the application of norms and principles such as inclusiveness, non-discrimination, participation, 
gender-sensitivity, transparency and accountability, which are especially crucial in a conflict setting 
and may represent the key factors for success and sustainability of results. These norms have been 
integrated into the design and modus operandi of the programmes and demonstrated in practice 
across the programme components. MIR and PRO have sustained and broadened the international 
and government engagement in the region, which is particularly important in conflict regions.  
Through participation of high-level governmental officials in the work of the Steering Committees and 
in programme related events and activities, the programmes have, despite some limitations, 
broadened government involvement and created a platform for interaction between government, 
donors, municipalities, NGOs and the private sector. In particular, PRO has also become a good 
international counterpart of civil society groups and a platform for facilitating civil society-local 
government dialogue. 
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The support of multiple donors and partners through a single multi-partner programme represents a 
positive example of donor coordination and has shown local communities and government that the 
region is important and that the international community has one agenda supporting the region. It 
has also improved the coherence, coordination and information exchanged among international 
partners involved in the regions. The need for such a platform will increase especially in the Southwest 
Serbia as potentially more international agencies enter the region. The constant presence of the MIR 
and PRO ‘infrastructure’ has allowed programme staff to support broader initiatives and processes 
beyond the programme scope.  Staff and facilities have been routinely used for briefings, data 
gathering and coordination purposes by a range of local, national and international groups.  This has 
facilitated a better understanding of the needs of the region, catalysed other initiatives and 
contributed to a continued focus on South Serbia and Southwest Serbia. Both conflict and 
development analyses show significant differences in needs and capacities across municipalities. By 
addressing these differences and reflecting municipal specificities, the programmes have been able to 
tackle key conflict and developmental issues in a regional manner, while not losing sight of the local 
context.  
 
Conclusions of the case studies. In every era there is a complex relationship between processes of 
governance, legitimacy and forms of security, and this complexity is further increased after the 
conflict. The ability to maintain order, to protect individuals in a physical sense, but also to provide a 
basis for administrative capacity and service delivery, to guarantee the rule of law, and to protect the 
territory externally are all key functions of political institutions from which their legitimacy is derived. 
The character of these institutions is largely defined in relation to the way in which these functions are 
undertaken. On the other hand, it’s impossible to provide security and other services and maintain the 
social contract without some underlying legitimacy. There also has to be a mechanism, ideally 
democratic consent, which explains why people obey rules and why in particular agents of organized 
violence follow orders.101 
 
If this context, summing up the findings of pervious sections, the programmes have undoubtedly 
improved overall situation, contributed to the stability and decreased the likelihood of the renewal 
or eruption of the violent conflict. Although the rapid employment of ex-combatants and the 
cooperation with the Coordination Body have directly improved the security situation and physical 
security of citizens, the main achievements can be particularly seen in contributing to the 
establishment of legitimate political authority predominantly at the local level. Confirming the 
importance of linkages between governance’s legitimacy, effectiveness and security dimensions 
emphasized in the academic literature,102 this has been achieved through the support to official 
structures as well as their interaction with the civil society organizations, other informal institutions 
and general public, emphasizing dialogue and planning, participatory and non-discriminatory 
processes and approaches. The support to local self-government and its administration increased the 
effectiveness in public management and service delivery, with subsequently contributed to its 
legitimate political authority. Additionally, through the investment in infrastructure and, to the lesser 
extent, the creation of conditions for functioning economy, the programmes improved social and 
economic security of the population. All this has also led to the improved interethnic relations. The 
results confirmed that the localised approach has been appropriate and successful.   
 
In more details, the ABD programmes have been effective in addressing the factors within their main 
focus such as governance and political representation, including support to civil society, economic 
development and social services delivery especially infrastructure, education and health. The 
programmes have effectively addressed especially first two areas at municipal and regional levels. 
Additionally they have succeeded in paying particular attention to decreasing inequalities in various 
areas. The programmes have advocated for and demonstrated the application of norms and principles 
such as inclusiveness, participation, transparency and accountability, which are crucial in a conflict 
setting and may represent key factors for success and sustainable peace and development. The 
support of multiple donors and partners through a single multi-partner programme represents a 
                                               
101 See Kaldor (2007), p. 180. 
102 Brinkerhoff (2005), p. 10.  
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positive example of donor coordination and has shown that the regions are important and that the 
international community is unified in supporting them. This has also improved the coherence, 
coordination and information exchanged among all partners. 
 
On the other hand, due to its predominant focus on a selected area, the programmes have been 
limited in reflecting and influencing broader context and responding to cross-border and national 
considerations especially as they relate to legitimate political authority on the national level (although 
cooperation with the Coordination Body has improved relation between local and national political 
authorities), security and economy. This was in particular visible in relation to macroeconomic 
policies and the overall underinvestment in the regions, the security situation, judiciary and 
education, especially as it relates to equal representation and the treatment of minorities, limited 
productive economic activities, out-migration, polarised and unprofessional media, and gender 
disparities. Additionally, due to the focus and design, but also the complexity and sensitivity of the 
issues, the programmes were unable to directly deal with the important issues related to democracy 
and governance relevant for the conflict and peace dynamic such as the role of ‘spoilers of peace’, 
criminals and influence of ‘identity politics’.103 On the other hand, through supporting establishment 
of functioning democratic institutions and accountability framework as well as positive development 
outlook, they have limited the scope of influence of these factors. Only the involvement in the 
mainstream politics coupled with a real political reform can have over time a chance of reducing their 
potential negative impact. Additionally, other important areas such as reconciliation and other 
instruments of transitional justice104 as well as issues related to the small arms105 could have been 
included in the programmes further contributing to the sustainability of the results. 
 
In short, the first set of factors, where the programmes performed well, have been in the main focus of 
the interventions as originally designed. Additional, more systemic and broader factors go beyond the 
original design of the interventions, however they are very important in increasing the conflict 
mitigation potential of the programmes. This point will be further elaborated in the findings and 
conclusions.    
 
 
5. FINDINGS  
 
Based on the empirical evidence from two case studies complemented by a questionnaire survey 
conducted among practitioners involved in ABD programmes in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the Ukraine,106 the study will now summarize the main findings related to a number of strengths, but 
also significant limitations of the area based development approach in responding to the multi-
dimensional, multi-level and dynamic character of conflict as described in chapter 3. These strengths 
and limitations are summarised in table 4 and discussed in the paragraphs to follow. In many cases, 
the strengths and limitations represent interrelated sides of a single aspect of the approach reflecting 
(and being caused by) the very nature of ABD integrating interrelated but to a certain extent mutually 
conflicting elements. This internal contradiction is what makes ABD potentially comprehensive. This 
however comes at a cost - the necessity to make often complex tradeoffs, the specific nature and depth 
                                               
103 Information on ‘spoilers of peace’ and organized crime are fragmented, for some data see for example for the South Serbia 
sections ‘Incidents in 2003’, ‘Responsibility for Incidents’ and ‘Organized Crime’ in ICG (2003) Southern Serbia’s Fragile 
Peace, Europe Report N°152, Belgrade/Brussels, p. 4 and 10, and for the Southwest Serbia sections ‘Economic Boom and Bust’ 
and ‘Post-Milosevic Sandzak’ in ICG (2005), p. 15 and 16. 
104 For types of transitional justice and relation to political conditions see for example Teitel, R. G. (2003), ‘Transitional Justice 
Genealogy’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 16, pp. 69-94.   
105 See for example UNDP Serbia (2003), Living with the Legacy – SALW Survey Republic of Serbia, SACISCG,  UNDP Small 
Arms Control in Serbia and Montenegro, 72p. This survey estimates that there are almost 2,9 million SALW in Serbia, 
suggesting an estimated 40 percent of households in Serbia have at least one registered firearm. This survey estimates that 
there are more than 900,000 unlicensed firearms in Serbia. It also suggests that most people own firearms because they want to 
protect themselves, their properties and their families. This is a possible indication of the legacy of conflict, poor state control 
and a mistrust of state authorities. 
106 The Questionnaire included questions related to ABD’s strengths and benefits, limitations, performance in conflict situations 
and lessons learned from practical applications. The survey was conducted among 14 practitioners involved in the 
implementation of ABD programmes in Serbia, the Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina.     
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of which depend on the specific context. This chapter and concluding chapters will therefore also 
include a brief analysis of these tradeoffs.   
 
Table 4: Summary of ABDs strengths, limitations and special benefits in conflict/post-conflict 
settings.    
 
Strengths and benefits Limitations Specific strengths in conflict/post-
conflict setting 
 
Integrated approach – allowing for holistic 
solutions and encouraging horizontal linkages 
and cross-sectoral responses even if problems 
are sector-specific as development and 
conflict prevention requires addressing a 
number of issues holistically to become 
sustainable (aspect mentioned in 9 
questionnaires). 
 
Platform for partnership and coordination – 
high potential for better coordination in a 
broader programmatic instead of a limited 
project approach, promoting cross-sectoral 
partnerships and division of labour (5). 
 
Promoting regional cooperation – utilization 
of economies of scale, facilitation of inter-
municipal cooperation and trust building, 
establishment of regional institutions and 
investment in regional infrastructure (4).  
 
Understanding of local context – 
understanding and taking into account 
specificity of the local situation, high level of 
insight and closeness to issues and 
beneficiaries (7). 
 
Involvement of local people – local 
empowerment, building of human capital, 
local people as agent of change (4). 
 
Enhancement of local democracy – 
promotion of integration, inclusiveness and 
non-discrimination through the involvement 
of the entire community rather than specific 
group, promotion of participation and 
transparency, avoiding stigmatization and 
mentality issue, reduction of perception of 
social inequality (9).  
 
Support to local governance – promoting 
subsidiarity and decentralization, 
capacitating local administration, supporting 
institutional development and organizational 
reform leading to increased effectiveness (4). 
 
Manageability and flexibility – focus on 
manageable size allowing for integrated, 
comprehensive approach, keeping 
programme relevant in changing context (5).   
 
Improved monitoring and cost-efficiency –
better monitoring of results and reflection of 
lessons learned, improved cost-efficiency 
through coherent approach avoiding 
duplications and addressing real needs (3). 
 
 
Missing macro picture – broader strategic 
context not sufficiently taken into account, 
weak understanding of macro situation and 
policies (4). 
 
Inability to respond to structural problems – 
even in the case of a good understanding of 
broader context,  there is no or limited 
influence on structural issues (e.g. related to 
conflict, governance, poverty, 
unemployment) (5). 
 
Limited partnerships and lack of coordination 
– insufficiently broad partnership or 
inadequate coordination, where partners 
have no sufficient capacity or mandate to deal 
with the problems, insufficient focus on or 
inability to deal with  economic development 
(4).  
 
Fragmentation – local approaches leading to 
fragmented thinking and realization, partial 
solutions and duplications (6). 
 
Lack of focus – dealing with a broad range of 
issues superficially leading to a lack of 
concentration on key problems and results 
(3).  
 
Visibility trap – concentration on the most 
visible and easy-to-implement activities 
instead of promoting systemic change (3). 
 
Dependency – developing dependency on 
external support, often lack of well planned 
exit strategy, Government reliance on 
external support leading to lack of 
involvement and support, preferential 
treatment for some areas (3). 
 
Capacity substitution – reducing urgency of 
systemic change, substituting for inefficiency 
of sectoral policies, insufficient institutional 
capacity or budgetary support (3). 
 
Donor-driven and short-term approach – 
interventions often donor-driven with high 
expectations and short timeline where 
conflict context and special development 
situation requiring longer time frame to 
generate systemic change (5).  
 
 
 
Local presence, ability to understand context 
and area-specific conflict characteristics and 
factors, ability to implement targeted 
interventions mitigating the conflict (6). 
 
Support to good governance, public pressure 
on leaders and decision makers, concentration 
on socio-economic issues often linked to 
problems leading to conflict, development of 
human capital, generating employment and 
improving living conditions (6). 
 
Non-discriminatory character in relation to 
groups involved in conflict, concentration on 
unifying rather than dividing factors (4).  
 
High level of operational flexibility in 
responding to the fast-changing conflict and 
post-conflict environment, ability to ensure 
proper participation, monitoring and 
adjustment of action (3).   
 
Working in the broader region not only in 
conflict municipalities/areas promoting 
integration, inclusiveness and cohabitation, 
encouraging social cohesion, tolerance and 
coexistence, bringing together different sides 
(3). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Localised approach versus fragmentation and lack of focus   
 
Local perspective, understanding of local specifics and the ability to take into account the specificity 
of the local context constitute the essential strength of the ABD approach. This entails the high level of 
insight and closeness to both issues and beneficiaries, together with the ability to implement targeted 
interventions mitigating the risk of conflict. In conflict settings, where an important part of conflict 
characteristics and its manifestations are predominantly local, the local perspective may represent a 
key success factor. Such approach subsequently leads to the broader involvement of local people, local 
empowerment and the creation of human capital, simply enabling the local population to be an agent 
of change. The promotion of inclusiveness, participation and transparency leads to the enhancement 
of local democracy. All this can positively address conflict characteristics related to political, but also 
perceptual and cultural factors. Contribution to the alleviation of the ‘dragging down’ effect, avoiding 
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stigmatization and mentality issues, reduction of the perception of social inequality and social 
integration are difficult to measure but have been routinely mentioned by interviewees as positive 
results of ABD programmes. Non-discrimination through the involvement of the entire community 
rather than one specific group and concentration on unifying rather than dividing issues is also 
important. Numerous examples of the above-mentioned contributions have been described in the case 
studies.  
 
Support to local governance through capacitating the local administration and supporting 
institutional development and organizational reform at the municipal level contributing to the 
substantive decentralisation of power and the institutionalisation of a systemic change is one of the 
most important and successful components of ABD programmes. The appropriateness of this 
approach is supported by the recent research in failed states and post-conflict societies, which 
underlines the importance of linkages among governance’s legitimacy, effectiveness and security 
dimensions.107 ABD often supports the building of legitimate political authority at the local level 
through supporting the official structure, but also its interaction with civil society, other informal 
institutions and the public through participatory and non-discriminatory processes. Simultaneously, 
the support to local self-government and administration increases its effectiveness in public 
management and service delivery contributing to its legitimate political authority. 
 
Additionally, as mentioned in chapter 3, the contemporary conflicts are often localized and one can 
recognize a mosaic of conflict and relatively stable areas. ABD programmes have therefore a potential 
not only for contributing to the conflict prevention in a particular conflict region, but also for 
preserving the stability of broader region or country by  ‘insulating’ other areas from the conflict. 
 
On the other hand, the local or area-specific activities may often lead to fragmentation, where local 
approaches suffer from partial and fragmented thinking, design and realization, leading to fragmented 
solutions and duplications. A related aspect is the lack of focus and concentration on key problems 
and results. Both shortcomings are the outcomes of an inappropriately applied integrated approach, 
attempting to deal with a broad range of issues superficially without a coherent strategy in mind. Last 
but not least is what could be called the visibility trap, a concentration on the most visible and easy-
to-implement activities (for example infrastructure) instead of promoting systemic change. Here, one 
needs to strike a balance between the use of infrastructure and visible interventions as a stimulus for 
politically difficult systemic changes, on the one hand, and the preoccupation with individual activities 
that partially improve the situation in a specific sector without systemically changing the general 
environment on the other. 
 
Potential for integration and inclusiveness versus missing macro picture and insufficient integration  
 
Based on the analysis in chapters 2 and 3, the integrated nature of ABD is what makes it appropriate 
to address issues related to conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and development as they 
all, in searching to achieve a sustainable solution, require addressing a number of dimensions, factors 
and sectoral issues in a holistic way. Addressing horizontal linkages and implementing cross-sectoral 
interventions that can simultaneously deal with the issues related to security, political, institutional, 
economic and social areas and with direct and indirect effects influencing culture and perception, is 
undoubtedly the right response to complex conflict characteristics as described in table 1. Both the 
case studies and the questionnaire have however identified several weaknesses and limitations of the 
approach related to the underutilisation of the integration potential, which in turn makes the 
approach less effective in conflict environments and complex developmental situations. This is what 
the study refers to as the contradiction in the terms ‘integrated’ and ‘area-based’, and leads to the 
situation where ABD programmes proved to be particularly effective in integrating dimensions and 
cross-sectoral synergies in the area of governance, institutional development, social services provision 
and economic development, especially at the local and regional levels. ABD programmes however 
proved to be less effective in integrating important aspects on supra-national and national levels. 
 
                                               
107 Brinkerhoff (2005), p. 10.  
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This leads to two limitations that the ABD approach is facing: The first is the (often) missing macro 
picture, when the broader strategic context at national and supra-national levels is inadequately taken 
into account. This may result in a weak understanding or misinterpretation of structural factors, both 
in terms of processes and policies contributing to the conflict or developmental problem. Often, even 
if a sufficient understanding of the broader context is in place there is either no ability or a limited 
ability to respond to structural issues related for example to security, governance, poverty and 
underdevelopment or unemployment.108 This is partly due to the conceptualization of ABD, where 
concentration on a given area detracts the attention from the broader context and complexity of the 
issues in question, as well as to implementation limitations, where the intervention is often seen by 
both national and local actors as a self-standing endeavour without systemic linkages to the national 
and supra-national context. The situation is often exacerbated by institutional and bureaucratic 
barriers within the organisations involved in the implementation. 
 
Secondly, the ABD potential to provide an integrated response often suffers from the fact that even at 
the local level some of the key conflict characteristics are only partially addressed and incorporated. 
This is for instance evident in the area of economic development, but issues related to discriminatory 
political institutions, economic and social inequalities, environmental considerations and security are 
often addressed only partially as well. The insufficient integration of the local or regional level conflict 
characteristics and development aspects related to weak state and economic development, often 
caused by the inability to address these complex issues is of crucial importance, as it on the one hand 
decreases the efficiency of the approach and additionally instead of discharging conflict potential, 
such interventions may actually increase it.  
 
The example of the two ABD programmes in Serbia prove that, despite the well functioning Steering 
Committees as the governing structure of the programmes, the involvement of the central 
Government in the programme implementation should have been deeper and more effective. It often 
remains limited to mid-level government officials, while the decision-making on several key issues 
clearly requires higher-level government participation. More involvement of line ministries in 
guidance and follow-up in areas such as investment, economic development, public administration 
reform and the environment would multiply and scale-up the programme results. It would also allow 
for progress on issues that are more political in nature and require changes at the national level, such 
as inclusion of minorities in institutions, security, privatization, education, judiciary and 
decentralization. This leads to a broader issue, which is the insufficient ability of these programmes to 
systematically deal with structural issues at the national and cross-border levels, which are in turn 
often the key factors for the success of initiatives on the lower levels. In this respect, the international 
community has also underutilized the opportunities to link political conditionalities at the national 
level to progress at the local level. The specific areas could include issues such as political participation 
and inclusion of minorities in institutions, improvement in education, judiciary and security with the 
development and investment activities at the municipal and inter-municipal levels, both in relation to 
the Government and the Albanian and Bosniak leadership.  
 
Broad partnership and regional focus versus context-specific approach  
 
ABD has been acknowledged as a good platform for partnership and coordination. It has been 
practically demonstrated to be effective in improving coordination among partners, including not only 
donors, but also local governments, NGOs, the private sector and often the central Government. This 
coordination and cooperation is taking place in a broader programmatic instead of a limited project 
approach, effectively promoting cross-sectoral partnerships. The overall governance structure of ABD 
programmes, support to regional development or investment projects at local level involving, both 
financially and substantively, local partners, the international community as well as central 
Government illustrate this aspect. In both regions, the support of multiple donors and partners 
                                               
108 The Institutional and Policy Reform Component indicating a systemic attention to structural issues have been included only 
in 9 out of 27 ADB programmes implemented in Europe and the CIS, see Harfst (2006), p. 61-63. Simultaneously, as a positive 
example the brief review of the Crimea Integration and Development Programme in the Ukraine indicated that the programme 
was able to deal with these issues more systemically.      
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through a single multi-partner programme represent a positive example of donor coordination and 
has improved the coherence, coordination and information exchange among international partners 
and local actors in the regions. There are however examples of the contrary as well when the potential 
for broad partnership is not being utilized, coordination is inadequate, and partners involved do not 
have sufficient capacity or the mandate to deal with the problem in its full complexity. All this often 
generates only partial and short-term results.  
 
The capability to promote regional cooperation through the facilitation of inter-municipal 
cooperation, the establishment of regional institutions and investment in regional infrastructure and 
the promotion of development driven by advanced municipalities is another important strength of the 
approach.109 In order to capitalize on economies of scale, reduce perceptions of differential treatment 
and bolster an identity as a positive example of a multi-ethnic region, the development efforts in both 
regions should follow a regional approach consistent with the Serbian Government’s recently 
approved equal regional development strategy. On the other hand, such approach needs to maintain a 
local perspective as the differences among municipalities in the regions both in respect to conflict 
characteristics and development require context-specificity and a tailor-made and municipality-
specific approach.  
 
Manageability versus inclusiveness  
 
Another set of strengths of the ABD approach are related to operational issues and in broader terms 
to, what could be called, manageability. The focus on a manageable size allows for the effective 
application of an often very complex integrated and comprehensive approach and the flexibility assists 
in keeping the programme relevant in a changing context. As indicated in chapter 3, this high level of 
operational flexibility in responding to the fast-changing situation in combination with the possibility 
to constantly adjust the action is essential particularly in a conflict environment. Both programmes 
have demonstrated high levels of flexibility in responding to the changing situation in the regions as 
well as to the demands of the partners leading to significant programme revision in South Serbia and 
to a new phase in Southwest Serbia.  This aspect of the approach moreover provides the conditions for 
better monitoring of results and instant reflection of lessons learned. In addition it arguably 
contributes to increased cost-effectiveness achieved through a coherent approach avoiding duplication 
and addressing actual priority needs. Obviously, the manageability can directly contradict the effort to 
broaden the integrated nature of the interventions to achieve higher inclusiveness discussed in the 
first paragraphs of this section, which can undermine this key strength of the approach. This 
represents serious trade-off and the point will be further elaborated in the conclusions of the paper.    
Involvement of the international community versus dependency, capacity substitution and 
cooptation of results  
 
It is broadly acknowledged as well as documented in the previous paragraphs that the involvement of 
the international community and the implementation of ABD programmes in South Serbia and 
Southwest Serbia have contributed to conflict prevention. However, as for other developmental 
interventions, ABD can lead to dependency on external support, particularly if designed and led by a 
consortium of donors and international organisations. This effect is often further exacerbated by the 
lack of a well thought-out strategic and operational framework with an appropriate and properly 
communicated exit strategy. Such a strategic and operational framework should be developed and 
closely aligned to other domestic policy processes, such as for instance the public administration 
reform and decentralization in Serbia. The abrupt withdrawal of donors or shift in government 
priorities can contribute to the escalation of the conflict. Paradoxically, the involvement of the 
international community can even reduce the involvement and commitments of the government in the 
region. In South Serbia, insufficient government engagement created the perception of the project as 
rather internationally – and less so governmentally - driven, attributing programme results largely to 
                                               
109 The importance of integrated development planning and regional cooperation has been emphasized also in European 
Stability Initiative (2005) The development trap at the heart of the Balkans. A socio-economic portrait of Gjilan, Kumanovo 
and Presevo, 29 p.  
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the international community. This attitude is not eroded even by statistics showing that such a 
perception is inaccurate and undervalues government contributions. Concentrating interventions at 
the specific region(s) of the country may also evoke the perception of preferential treatment for 
certain areas, potentially further contributing to the perception of deprivation and to the conflict.  
 
Another potential problem, not specifically related to ABD, but rather to development assistance in 
general, is the capacity substitution. In spite of good intentions, external intervention can reduce the 
urgency of systemic change and substitute for inefficiency of sectoral policies, lack of institutional 
capacity or insufficient budgetary support. Some of these factors may be observed also in the two 
regions analysed in the study. Finally, the issue of cooptation of results and manipulation of the 
programme for political purposes is particularly important in a region facing risk of conflict as it can 
further aggravate it. Especially in Southwest Serbia several interviewees highlighted the risk of co-
optation and misrepresentation of development results for political purposes, potentially contributing 
to some of conflict characteristics. In this relation, the high credibility of the programmes should be 
more often utilised to deliver messages on conduct and practices to counterparts especially to local 
politicians and municipal officials.   
  
The other side of the dependency and capacity substitution effects of external assistance, described 
above, is a tendency to implement short-term interventions, which are often donor-driven with high 
expectations under a short timeframe. An attempt to deal with the conflict situation in a systemic way, 
given the complexity of conflict characteristics, certainly requires a longer time frame.110 The need for 
longer-term engagement is also in line with the findings on the positive correlation between the time 
from a previous conflict and the risk of its renewal described in academic literature and in chapter 3 of 
the study. 
 
   
6. CONCLUSIONS  
 
As illustrated in table 5 integrating the findings of chapters 3 and 4, the above mentioned strengths 
and limitations are reflected in the situation where ABD programmes predominantly operate in a 
bottom-left part of the spectrum, largely concentrating on social, economic and governance-related 
factors at the local and regional levels, with decreasing influence as moving further up and towards 
the right-side of the spectrum. This reflects the conceptualisation and typical design of the 
interventions and in these areas the approach clearly proved to be effective with some very successful 
results. However, this is insufficient to capture the conflict characteristics in their full complexity and 
become an even more effective conflict prevention tool leading to sustainable peace and development. 
Evidently, some of the national and cross-border issues, especially political, economic and security 
related, are often difficult to understand and influence. Still, as the study strongly argues, these 
important dimensions have to be taken into consideration as they create conditions for (or limitations 
to) solving the area-specific problems. Arguably, the systemic change is impossible without the effort 
to simultaneously and appropriately address all or most of the dimensions included in the table below 
at multiple levels. Having said that, the integration and incorporation of various issues has its limits, 
otherwise the intervention becomes over-complex and impossible to direct and manage. The effective 
approach should maintain for that reason a certain balance between the inclusiveness and 
manageability. Nevertheless, the current balance seems to be notably shifted towards manageability 
at the expense of inclusiveness.  
 
In order to be effective in a conflict setting, ABD has to further utilise its strengths and minimise or 
offset its limitations. In doing so, it has to move towards a more integrated and multi-level approach. 
                                               
110 For instance Lederach (in Lederach, J. P. (1997) Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, US 
Institute of Peace Press, Washington ) suggests that developing an infrastructure for peace-building that tackles the crises stage 
and issues should take 2-6 months, the people and relations 1-2 years and the institutions or sub-systems 5-10 years, while 
moving towards sustainable peace and a desired future may take generations. Both analyzed programmes have taken rather 
long-term approach, with the South Serbia programme (including its precursors) operating for 8 years, and the Southwest 
Serbia envisaged to be implemented under current design for almost 5 years.      
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As shown in the conflict analysis, most of the conflict factors and characteristics can be addressed only 
through a comprehensive and long-term effort represented by a further broadened integrated and 
multilevel approach incorporating multi-sector and multi-level interventions within a well-
coordinated strategic and operational framework. This approach should consist of the interventions in 
governance, including support to legitimate political authority and institutional development, 
economic and social development and the security sector. Interventions should be identified through 
thorough developmental and conflict analysis and implemented simultaneously at municipal, 
regional, national and cross-border levels. In order to make this proposal operational, firstly at local 
and regional level, the approach should be more integrative and respond inclusively to as many 
conflict factors as possible across structural, political, economic and social and environmental 
dimensions. Secondly, it should to the extent possible include national level factors that are often key 
for progress in addressing the factors at local and regional levels. Thirdly, the cross-border or national 
level factors which cannot be directly included in the initiative should be understood and taken into 
consideration as context characteristics when designing and implementing these initiatives. This 
proposal is illustrated in table 5 and the scheme in annex III.     
 
Table 5: Conflict characteristics matrix and current and proposed broader area-based         
development approach.  
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Regional economic policies 
and trade  
Existence of Diaspora 
 
 
  
Scarcity of resources  
Environmental degradation 
Environmental externalities 
 
 
Role of neighbouring states/ 
inter-state security concerns 
History of conflict, problematic 
group histories 
Ethnic geography 
Illicit and criminal activities 
 
N
A
T
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N
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L
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macro-economic problems 
Low level, slow growth and 
structure of income  
Level of unemployment  
Failure of social contract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weak state and governance 
Exclusionary national 
ideologies 
Identity politics  
Discriminatory political 
institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Natural resource endowment 
Scarcity of resources  
Environmental degradation 
Environmental externalities 
 
 
Mountainous country/ rough 
terrain 
Size of the population 
Ethnic geography 
Strength of the military  
 
 
 
 
 
Weak state 
History of conflict, problematic 
group histories  
Patterns of cultural 
discrimination 
Illicit and criminal activities 
 
R
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Level of unemployment  
Vertical inequalities   
Horizontal economic 
inequalities 
Horizontal social inequalities 
Male secondary education 
enrolment   
 
 
 
 
 
Weak governance  
Identity politics  
Discriminatory political 
institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
Scarcity of resources  
Environmental degradation 
 
 
 
 
History of conflict, problematic 
group histories  
Patterns of cultural 
discrimination 
Illicit and criminal activities 
 
 
 
 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
 
POLITICAL 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
 
STRUCTURAL 
 
 
 
In order to avoid undermining manageability as one of the key strengths of the approach, not all 
interventions should be included in the initiative itself. It is proposed to address some of the conflict 
factors thorough parallel, but well coordinated activities. This coordinated framework should reflect 
mandates and capacities of various partners in addressing different dimensions of conflict and 
development. Additionally, some cross-border and national level issues cannot be addressed directly 
through specific interventions due to their complexity and political sensitivity and should be targeted 
through advocacy and policy advice instead. This will require a much broader partnership structure. 
Such a broad partnership should attempt to link together all planned or already on-going activities 
currently implemented separately by local partners, the international community and central 
 
 
 
 
 
Current ABD approach  
        Broadened integrated and multilevel approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
          
          
 
 
           
 
 
 
 
Context characteristics  
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Government into one strategy led by legitimate political authorities. The involvement of national level 
actors has been insufficient so far and effective involvement of the central Government remains one of 
the key factors for the success of this approach. Equal attention should be placed on how current and 
future activities are being implemented, taking into consideration the specificity of a multi-ethnic and 
conflict region.  
 
Linking political and developmental agendas can significantly increase the conflict mitigation impact 
of development activities. In order to ensure progress in addressing key conflict factors the 
programmes and investments need to be directly linked to the conditionality of political stability, 
security, administrative reform, accountability and transparency at local, regional and national levels. 
In the two regions, the conditionality should be applied with regard to security, including the army 
and police and the judiciary to ensure improved performance and political independence, and to 
bolster equitable representation from minorities. The EU accession process with its focus on political 
requirements and pre-accession assistance could provide an appropriate framework for making these 
links to ensure progress i) in local self-government on transparency, accountability and administrative 
reform, ii) in local judiciary and police on performance, political independence and ethnic 
representation and iii) in central government on decentralization and public administration reform. 
In addition, the existing European Union Neighbourhood Programme could be used to address cross-
border issues through strengthening cooperation with Bulgaria, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Montenegro.  
 
*** 
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Annex I: Conflict and peace dynamics in South Serbia 
 
Positive contextual factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex II: Conflict and peace dynamics in Southwest Serbia 
 
 
Split in Islamic 
Community 
Political divide 
among Bosniak 
parties 
Electoral 
violence 
Clashes and 
scuffles 
 
Emergence of 
Wahhabism 
Rapid 
urbanisation and 
migration 
Manipulated 
media 
Historic under-
investment 
Weak macro-
economic policy 
Limited economic 
activities 
High 
unemployment 
“Bad 
neighbourhood” 
Illicit economic 
activities/crime 
Weak governance 
Weak judiciary 
 
Excluded civil 
society 
Lacking capacity 
and low quality 
education 
Good inter-ethnic 
relations 
Trade and 
entrepreneurial 
spirit 
Common 
language 
Resilience to 
conflict 
Remittances 
from Diaspora 
Significant 
economic 
potential 
Geography: 
trade transit 
point and market 
access 
History of 
coexistence 
Increasing 
international 
assistance and 
attention 
Visible conflict indicators 
Underlying conflict indicators 
Visible peace indicators 
Underlying peace indicators 
Migration 
Higher education 
Health services 
Higher education 
Health services 
Water and waste 
Education 
Health services 
Access to Social Services 
Historical under-
investment in region 
Access to jobs 
State investment in 
municipalities 
Privatisation 
Access to jobs 
Unemployment levels 
 
 
Economic Inequality 
Government, 
Parliament, Access to 
decision-makers 
District and State 
structures 
Coordination Body 
Municipal 
Administration 
Judiciary and Police 
Inter-Regional Inter-Municipality Inter-Community 
Political Representation and Participation Gender  
disparities 
Limited  
social 
interaction 
Provocation 
and symbolic 
actions 
Distrust 
Perceptions 
versus 
reality 
Remittances/  
out-migration 
Presence of 
International 
Community 
Conflict  
fatigue 
History of 
coexistence 
Brain-drain 
Inconsistent 
politics and  
policies  
Cross-border 
activities 
Complex  
political 
environment 
Polarised 
media 
Kosovo 
situation   
Adverse  
macroeconomic 
 policy 
Militarised  
and poor 
region 
Negative contextual factors 
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Annex III: Proposed comprehensive integrated and multilevel approach 
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         Integrated and multilevel approach 
 
 
 
 
 
